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The Uniform Adoption Act's Health
Disclosure Provisions: A Model That
Should Not Be Overlooked
MARIANNE BROWER BLAIR*
I. Introduction
In the vigorous public debate engendered by the recent approval of
a new Uniform Adoption Act' by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the Act's comprehensive
health disclosure provisions have been largely overshadowed by some
of its more controversial sections. The 1994 Uniform Adoption Act's
(UAA or Act) health disclosure provisions' provide an excellent model
for states to follow as they consider revisions to their current adoption
statutes. It would be unfortunate if they get lost in the fray.
Legislation providing for the disclosure of nonidentifying health infor-
mation is not a new idea. During the past two decades virtually every
state has enacted laws providing for the disclosure of some medical infor-
mation to adoptive parents, and many of these statutes authorize the re-
lease of information to adult adoptees and birth parents. 3 The statutes
governing health disclosure in many states, however, are currently not
sufficiently comprehensive or rigorous. The UAA improves upon ex-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws first ap-
proved a Uniform Adoption Act in 1953. In 1969, NCCUSL approved a Revised
Uniform Adoption Act, which was amended in 1971. The UAA referred to throughout
this article was approved by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in 1994 and supersedes
the Revised Uniform Adoption Act of 1969. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 1 (West
Supp. 1995).
2. The term "health disclosure" refers to the disclosure of nonidentifying infor-
mation related to the medical and social history of an adoptee and the adoptee's biologi-
cal family.
3. See Appendix A.
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isting statutory disclosure schemes in many ways, such as the inclu-
siveness of the information to be disclosed; the timing of the disclosure;
its provision for post-adoption supplementation, retention, and release
of information; its immunity and confidentiality protections; and its pro-
visions for sanctions and liability for noncompliance. The purposes of
this article are to highlight these and other aspects of the UAA that would
improve current law in many states; to suggest some additional, or in
a few minor instances, alternative provisions the states might wish to
consider; to discuss implementation issues; and to comment upon the
interrelationship between the UAA's provisions for civil liability and the
current status of the state courts' recognition of liability for nondisclosure
under common law theories such as fraud and negligence.
H. The Critical Importance of
Comprehensive Disclosure Statutes
During much of this century, 4 it was common practice for adoption
agencies to disclose very limited information about the medical and
social background of a child and the child's biological family to adoptive
parents . The consequences of this approach have often been tragic.
In numerous instances, adopted children failed to receive appropriate
4. The movement to enact statutes requiring confidentiality in adoption began in
the 1920s. These statutes typically mandated the sealing of adoption records and re-
quired a judicial finding of good cause to obtain access to them. ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE §§ 1.03[4], 13.01[1][b], 16.01[I] (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1988) [hereinafter
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE]. Prior to that time, adoptions in America were often
open. It was not uncommon for birth mothers to stay with the adoptive family during
pregnancy. Adoptive families were often chosen by the birth mother's family. In fact,
during the late nineteenth century, newspapers routinely reported details of adoption
proceedings. LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION 85 (1990).
5. See, e.g., ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 35-36
(1978); ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 13.01[l][b] and [c], 16.0[1l];
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, COMMITTEE ON EARLY CHILDHOOD, ADOPTION,
AND DEPENDENT CARE, ISSUES OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN ADOPTION: THE ROLE OF
THE PEDIATRICIAN, PUBLICATION No. RE 9405 (1994); Karen Fernau, Lawsuits Filed
over Adoptions, Information on Children Withheld, Parents Say, PHOENIX GAZETTE,
July 5, 1993, at 3 ("Conventional thinking before the mid-1980s was that the biological
parents' rights to privacy often took precedence over adoptive parent's desires to have
information released. "); Rob Karwath, Teenager's Adoptive Parents Sue, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 29, 1989, § 2, at 12 (David Sneidman, spokesperson for the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services, stated that prior to the enactment of the Illinois'
disclosure law in 1985, the conventional wisdom of adoption agencies was that adopted
children and parents were better off not knowing background information.). Cf. E.
Wayne Carp, Adoption and Disclosure of Family Information: A Historical Perspec-
tive, 74 CHILD WELFARE 217, 219, 225, 230 (1995) (author concludes that in the first
half of the twentieth century the majority of adoption agencies disclosed what little
family information was available, citing his own study of one agency's records; a
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psychiatric or medical treatment they desperately needed because medi-
cal information that was readily available was not revealed to the adop-
6tive parents. As a result, children with psychiatric disorders that might
have been successfully treated at a young age were ultimately institu-
tionalized as adolescents .7 Some children mutilated themselves or at-
study of 30 agencies in 1937 that found the agencies evenly divided, half revealing
all non-identifying information and the other half disclosing as little as possible to
adoptive parents about background information; and another study in 1947 finding
that 70% of the 95 agencies surveyed revealed whatever nonidentifying information
they had. He further concludes that in the early 1950s, a marked change in philosophy
among social workers and agencies occurred and agencies increasingly disclosed to
adoptive parents only favorable medical and social information, or chose to reveal
none at all.).
6. Psychiatrists who work with children with "attachment disorder," many of
whom exhibit psychopathic behavior, report that the chances of a successful therapy
outcome are greatly increased if the child is diagnosed when young. For children over
seven, the chances of success are only about 50%, and for children over age eleven,
the likelihood of recovery is even lower. KEN MAGID & CAROLE A. McKELVEY, HIGH
RISK 149, 216 (1987). Knowledge of the occurrence of schizophrenia or manic-
depression in biological relatives can hasten diagnosis and appropriate drug therapy.
Deborah Franklin, What a Child is Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, § 6, at 36, 41
(After years of unsuccessful therapy, adopted daughter was diagnosed at age 17 with
bipolar disorder, a condition the adoptive family later discovered afflicted her birth
father. "Laura had so much pain and went undiagnosed for so long," her mother
lamented. "She didn't just need family therapy. She needed lithium.").
7. See, e.g., David Postman, Sins of Silence, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996,
(News), at 6 (child whose violent past was undisclosed was subsequently institutional-
ized.); Diane Klein, An Adopted Boy-And Terror Begins, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1988,
§ 1 (Home), at 3 (Tommy Colella, whose diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome with
psychotic behavior was not shared with his adoptive parents, was ultimately institution-
alized. His adoptive mother observed, "[a]s awful as it was, we know that Tommy
suffered more than we did. He was denied the treatment he needed. The system failed
him."); Diane Klein, "Special" Children, Dark Past Can Haunt Adoptions, L.A.
TIMES, May 29, 1988, § 1, at 1 (Social workers for years withheld an extensive family
history of schizophrenia from the adoptive parents of "Monica," who endured years
of inappropriate therapy and was ultimately institutionalized.); Karwath, supra note
5, at 12 (Adoptive mother of an institutionalized son who learned 12 years after the
adoption that both birth parents had been institutionalized for mental problems, ob-
served, "If we had had this information earlier maybe we could have been more aware
of things to look for and gotten more expert help sooner."); Bonnie Jacob, Raising
Cain, NEW DOMINION, May-June 1989, at 36 (Adoptive father of institutionalized son
suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome, from whom pre-placement evidence of organic
brain damage was withheld, quoted as saying, "The cruel thing is that not knowing
about John's condition has cost him so much time. Time we spent on therapies that
didn't work, time wasted when doctors said, 'He's just a hyperactive, normal kid.
He'll grow out of it.' Now it may be too late to help John, or it may take 10 times
longer than it would have if we'd started right in the first place."); Daniel Golden,
When Adoption Doesn't Work, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 1989, § 16, at 73 (Despite
state psychiatrist's recommendation that child receive long-term psychiatric care instead
of adoptive placement, child was placed for adoption, subsequently tried to kill adoptive
father, and was ultimately institutionalized.).
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tempted suicide.8 Some children with physical or genetic disorders
underwent painful, expensive, and sometimes hazardous diagnostic
testing that could have been avoided, 9 or received improper medical
treatment that delayed recovery, and occasionally resulted in permanent
disability.10 Siblings in adoptive families have been raped, tortured,
sexually molested, and threatened by adopted children whose parents
were given no warning about similar past behavior and psychiatric
problems of the child. 1 Adoptive families without adequate information
were left totally unprepared for, and emotionally devastated by their
8. Postman, supra note 7, at 6 (Adopted girl whose violent past was allegedly undis-
closed hurt herself with pins and needles and became obsessed with knives.); Jack Fried-
man, He's Not Our Son, PEOPLE, July 11, 1988, at 38, 40-41 (adopted child, whose
extensive records on his psychiatric disorder were not revealed to adoptive family, at-
tempted repeatedly to set fires, mutilate himself, and commit suicide by hanging); RICH-
ARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY, ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS AND
RESPONSES 176 (1988) (eight year old who practiced satanic worship and sliced his penis
was placed with adoptive father unaware of this behavior at time of placement); Marshall
Marvelli, Ton andJanice Colella, People, Aug. 1, 1988, at 6 (letter to editor describing
adopted daughter's self-abuse and preoccupation with fire).
9. See John R. Ball & Gilbert S. Omenn, Genetics, Adoption, and the Law,
GENETICS AND THE LAW II 277 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1980);
Gilbert S. Omenn et al., Genetic Counseling for Adoptees at Risk for Specific Inherited
Disorders, 5 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 157, 162 (1980); Ginny Whitehouse, Remarks
at Conference on Genetic Family History: An Aid to Better Health ofAdopted Children,
in WISCONSIN CLINICAL GENETICS CENTER & WAISMAN CENTER ON MENTAL RETAR-
DATION & HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter
GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY]; National Center for Education in Maternal & Child Health,
An Aid to Better Health of Adoptive Children, 19 (1984) (discovery by adult adoptee
of history of fibrous breast lumps avoided repetition of painful treatment that might
otherwise have been necessary); Franklin, supra note 6, at 40 (adoptee underwent
painful test to reach a diagnosis ofjuvenile chronic arthritis, a disease he later discovered
was prevalent in his birth family).
10. See Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990) (Ambiguous information
provided to adoptive family and pediatrician led them to believe a test for phenylketonu-
ria had been performed. It had not, and the child suffered severe permanent brain
damage, which could have been avoided with proper diet and treatment.); Young v.
Francis, 820 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Parents allege death of their child from
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome might have been avoided if agency had released com-
plete information indicating neurological abnormalities.).
The severe impairments and brain damage which can result from other hereditary
disorders, such as homocystinuria, can also be largely avoided if diagnosed early and
treated properly. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 722 (25th ed. 1990); Ann T.
Lamport, Comment, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, Artificial Insemination, and
In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 114 & n.32 (1988). Some hereditary
disorders can be life-threatening if not properly diagnosed and treated. For example,
familial polyposis, creating symptoms in late childhood, almost invariably leads to
carcinoma of the colon if left untreated. Omenn et al., supra note 9, at 162; STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1238 (25th ed. 1990).
11. Postman, supra note 7, at 6-7, (Adoptive family who had not been told of
son's psychiatric disorder discovered that boy had repeatedly raped their daughter,
from the time she was four years old, and secured her silence with threats to kill her;
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children's destructive behavior, fire-setting, violence, and threats. 1 In
some families the extreme stress caused by this unanticipated behavior
contributed to the deterioration of the adoptive parents' marriage1 3 or
disruption of the adoptive placement. Although attempted adoption re-
vocations are rare, they have increased as adoptive parents felt de-
frauded, betrayed, and helpless to meet the unexpected emotional and
financial demands of their child's disorder. 14
another family learned after their adopted daughter was ultimately institutionalized
that she had sexually assaulted and tortured her adopted baby sister.); Jane Hadley,
Parents Sue Over Adoptions, State Blamedfor Failure to Disclose Children's Problems,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, February 23, 1995, at 2 (adopted son sexually abused
the adopted daughter of a King County Family); Patricia Miller, State Court Weights
Law to Protect Against Dishonest Adoption Agents, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, April
17, 1994, at 2 (After threats to their younger son, adoptive parents in McKean County,
Pa. ultimately removed adopted son from their home, "fearing for the safety of their
younger child"); Golden, supra note 7, at 79, (Jacob Clemons, in an apparent suicide
attempt, killed his two younger brothers in a fire); Klein, supra note 7, at 1 ("Monica"
tried twice to suffocate baby sister); Catherine Clabby, Adoption Woe, Parents Allege
Sexual-Abuse Cover-Up, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Dec. 20, 1992, at A-1 (Adopted son
sodomized an adopted brother). See also In re Robert S., 647 N.E. 2d 869 (Ohio App.
1994) (adopted son exhibited violent behavior to newly adopted baby brother).
12. See Andrea Sachs, When the Lullaby Ends, Time, June 4, 1990, at 82 (adopted
son tried to cut off his cousin's arm, and on another occasion set fire to the cousin's
room while he slept); Golden, supra note 7, at 16, 73, 82 (Adopted daughter set fire
that almost burned the house down, stole, fought repeatedly with her parents and older
sister, and tried to poison her father with Lysol. Tension was so high her sister's
friends stopped coming over. Attacks by other adopted children also described.); Lisa
Belkin, Adoptive Parents Ask States for Help With Abused Young, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 1988, at A l (Adopted child attempted to burn down house and threatened younger
brother with knife; attacks by other children also described.); Jacob, supra note 7, at
35 (previously well-adjusted sister began staying in her room behind closed doors due
to adopted brother's behavior); Klein, supra note 7, at 16 (siblings lived in constant
turmoil and fear because of violent behavior of adopted daughter "Monica").
In Colorado an organization founded for parents of adoptive children who are violent
and mentally ill gained 2,000 members during its first five months. Belkin, supra, at
Al.
13, Golden, supra note 7, at 82 (Parents of Lisa G., whose violent and destructive
behavior ultimately led to her institutionalization, separated a few months after her
adoption was revoked.); id. at 79 (One adoptive mother who leads workshops for
adoptive families observed, "A lot of people stay in the [adoptive] commitment after
it doesn't workout. And to me, that's really unhealthy because it affects the rest of
the family. I've seen so many marriages break up over it."); Jacob, supra note 7, at
35 (reporting that stress related to son's behavior caused adoptive couple to fight
continuously.); Fernau, supra note 5, at 4 (quoting one adoptive mother, "I love this
boy so much that the idea of giving him up is the last, last, last resort. One neurologist
asked me if I was willing to destroy my family to save a child that can't be saved.
We just don't know the answer yet.").
14. The term adoption disruption is used by social scientists to describe any adoptive
placement that has ended, whether before or after finalization. Disruption can cause
a child tremendous instability and emotional upheaval, which can be permanently
damaging, and diminishes the child's chances for successful adoption thereafter. Social
scientists studying adoption disruption found that "Among families that reported no
information gaps, the disruption rate was only 19%. Among families reporting one
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Beginning in the late 1970s,15 experts in the field of adoption began
endorsing full disclosure of health information to adoptive parents.6
Professionals who place children with special needs or who are at risk
for medical problems have come to realize that providing prospective
adoptive parents with the most complete information available is essen-
tial to ensuring that the family is both emotionally and financially able
to cope with the challenges such a child presents. 17 Moreover, adoption
or more gaps, the disruption rate was 46%." BARTH & BERRY, supra note 8, at 20,
108-09. See also K. NELSON, ON THE FRONTIER OF ADOPTION: A STUDY OF SPECIAL
NEEDS ADOPTIVE FAMILIES 74-75 (1985).
Between 1983 and 1987, 69 adoption annulments in California were attributed to
fraudulent misrepresentation by a county agency regarding a child. Klein, supra note
7, at 32. Actions seeking annulment or revocation for failure to disclose medical
information have been filed in several states in recent years. See Christopher C. v.
Kay C., 278 Cal. Rptr. 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (Adoption revocation granted because
adoptive parents had not been told prior to placement of child's serious mental illness
and expert opinion advising against adoption.); M.L.B. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab.
Serv., 559 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding one-year period in which
to attack validity of adoption does not preclude motion to set aside adoption on grounds
of alleged fraudulent concealment of child's psychiatric disorder); County Dep't of
Public Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1958); In re Leach,
128 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1964); In re Anonymous, 213 N.Y.2d 10 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
1961); In re Adoption of Haggerty, No. CA-741, 1991 WL 115978 (Ohio App.)
(rejecting as not timely a motion to vacate an adoption decree on grounds of fraudulent
nondisclosure of child's behavior and emotional problems); In re Adoption of T.B.,
622 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1993) (Adoptive parent's request for revocation was refused
because failure of county agency to reveal sexual abuse of child, who had threatened
to kill adoptive mother, was a negligent failure to investigate and not fraudulent).
For accounts of other revocation actions based upon misrepresentation, see Klein,
Special Children, supra note 7, at 1; Belkin, supra note 12, at B8; Golden, supra note
7, at 82; Klein, Adopted Boy's Hidden Past Led Family to Life of Terror, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1988, § 2, at 1; Marvelli, supra note 8, at 6 (attempted revocation); Miller,
supra note 11, at 2 (pending revocation proceeding).
15. See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 5, at 36 (observing that the Child Welfare
League of America (CWLA), a national affiliation of adoption agencies and publisher
of adoption standards, has recommended since 1971 that adoptive parents be given
nonidentifying medical and social background information); Carp, supra note 5, at
234 (reporting that in 1978, CWLA revised its standards and "eliminated completely
the section on withholding adverse information from adoptive parents").
16. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at §§ 13.01[1], 16.01(2]; SOR-
OSKY ET AL., supra, note 5, at 36. See also NELSON, supra note 14, at 92-93 (recom-
mending full disclosure based upon study of special needs adoptive families). Summary
of testimony of adoption experts in Backes v. Catholic Family and Community Svcs.,
509 A.2d 283, 287, 298, 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985); CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 37-39 (rev. ed. 1988);
Carp, supra note 5, at 233-34 (The policy of adoption agencies to withhold negative
medical and social background information from adoptive parents waned in the early
1980s.).
17. James A. Rosenthal, Outcomes of Adoption of Children with Special Needs,
3(1) THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: ADOPTION, 84-85 (1993) [hereinafter ADOPTION];
NELSON, supra note 14, at 48-49 & 85-86 ("Arguably the parents' own informed
opinion about the suitability of a placement is one of the best predictions of outcome.
The most effective preparation, then, does not merely educate parents; it enables them
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professionals now understand that compiling and disclosing a complete
medical and genetic history is vital to children with no apparent health
problems at the time of placement, because accurate medical informa-
tion is critical to proper diagnosis, treatment, and preventive measures
throughout an adoptee's lifetime. " Adult adoptees also require accurate
medical and genetic information to make informed choices about their
own reproductive decisions.19 Post-adoption supplementation of medi-
cal information and disclosure to adult adoptees and birth family mem-
bers provide protection not only to adoptees and their descendants, but
also to siblings and others who are biologically related 0 to an adoptee.21
State legislatures responded during the 1980s by amending their
adoption statutes to provide for the collection and disclosure of some
health-related information during and subsequent to the adoption pro-
cess. 22 Despite their praiseworthy efforts and the consensus of most
adoption professionals supporting this reform, however, inadequate
to take charge of placement decisions."); BARTH & BERRY, supra note 8, at 175-76;
Victor Groze, Mark Haines-Simeon & J. Curtis McMillen, Families Adopting Children
With orAt Risk of HIV Infection, 9 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOCIAL WORK JOURNAL
409, 411 (1992) [hereinafter Groze et al.]; Carp, supra note 5, at 233. Psychologists
who treat disturbed children reach the same conclusion: "[A]gencies should fully
disclose to adoptive parents the background of the child and fully prepare perspective
parents if they are to receive an unattached child." MAGID & MCKELVEY, supra note
6, at 153. See also A Child is Waiting: The Report of the Binsfield Commission on
Adoption 28 (1992) (Commission in Michigan delegated to study special needs adoption
recommends disclosure of "non-identifying medical, genetic, and health history of
the child and his or her biological parents.").
18. See Madelyn DeWoody, Adoption and Disclosure of Medical and Social His-
tory: A Review of the Law, 72 CHILD WELFARE 195 (1993) (author is general counsel
and director of program development for Child Welfare League of America); SOROSKY
ET AL., supra note 5, at 126-27; Ball & Omenn, supra note 9, at 277-78; Diane
Plumridge et al., ASHG & Activities Relative to Education: Heredity and Adoption,
A Survey of State Adoption Agencies, 46 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 208, 212-13 (1990);
Franklin, supra note 6, at 41.
19. Rita B. Black, Genetics and Adoption: A Challenge for Social Work, Social
Work in A Troubled World: Seventh NASW Symposium 198, 205 (Miriam Dinerman
ed., 1981); Omenn et al., supra note 9, at 162; Plumridge et al., supra note 18, at
209; SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 5, at 124, 142, 144.
20. DeWoody, supra note 18, at 195; Plumridge et al., supra note 18, at 209;
Catherine A. Reiser, Basic Principles of Genetics: A Human Approach, in GENETIC
FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 65-66 (describing autosomal and x-linked recessive
conditions that skip generations); Lamport, supra note 10, at 114 (reporting on physi-
cian who was unable to alert birth parents to diagnosis of Meckel Syndrome, a generally
lethal genetic illness, in adopted child).
21. For more comprehensive discussion of the arguments favoring full disclosure
of medical and social background information in adoption, see Marianne Blair, Lifting
the Genealogical Veil: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform of the Disclosure of Health
Related Information in Adoption, 70 N.C. L. REV. 681, 695-713 (1992).
22. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at § 16.01[2]. See Blair, supra
note 21, at 713-76 for an indepth review of the disclosure statutes in effect in the early
1990s. Many of these statutes have been amended since that time. See Appendix A.
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disclosure of medical information remains a problem. 23 The comprehen-
sive collection and disclosure provisions of the UAA suggest many
areas where current statutory schemes could be strengthened and, thus,
merit serious consideration.
III. The Collection and Disclosure of Health Information
During the Adoption Process
A. Compilation of Background Information
1. SCOPE OF INFORMATION
An obviously crucial step in the disclosure process is the initial infor-
mation-gathering stage, when medical and social history is collected.
It is vital that this process be regulated by statute, which must specify
in detail the type of information to be compiled. One of the strengths
of the UAA is its comprehensive description of the information that
should be obtained, found in section 2-106(a).24
a. Child's Medical History
First and foremost, this section requires a current medical and psycho-
logical history of the child. While this may seem patently obvious, many
states' disclosure statutes focus only on the medical history of the birth
parents and omit reference to the child's own history. 25 This is a costly
23. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 5, at 1 ("All states require
a medical and genetic history to be obtained at the time of adoption, but these histories
are often incomplete and inaccurate. "). See also Miller, supra note 11, at 2-3 (Adoptive
parents allege nondisclosure of emotional problems in 1990 adoption); Postman, supra
note 11, at 1-4 (At least 14 families are bringing suit against DSHS in the State of
Washington, alleging DSHS social workers failed to disclose crucial information about
their adopted child's psychological history, despite a state law in place since 1979 and
DSHS regulations that required disclosure of mental, physical and sensory handicaps.
"The law has since been made more explicit and expanded to require more disclo-
sure. "); Fernau, supra note 5, at 1 (adoptive parents sued agency for failure to disclose
records of birth mother's retardation and psychological disorders in a 1988 adoption,
despite a 1984 Arizona law requiring disclosure of health and genetic history.); Groze
et al., supra note 17, at 418, 423 (many parents in 1992 study of adoptive families of
children with or at risk of HIV reported that background information was insufficient).
Just this spring the author attended an adoption presentation in which a psychologist
presented a case study of a recent local adoption in which an adoptive family had not
been told of a child's prior record of sexual misconduct, several siblings in the adoptive
family were sexually assaulted by the child, the adoption ultimately disrupted, and
the child was institutionalized.
24. U.A.A. § 2-106 (1994). For text, see Appendix B.
25. Currently the disclosure statutes of at least nine states, Alaska, Connecticut,
Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Vermont, focus on the medical history of biological relatives and not the child. Presum-
ably, these statutes were drafted with infant adoptions in mind. However, non-infant
adoptions make up a large percentage of all nonrelative domestic adoptions. NATIONAL
COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, 1989 ADOPTION FACTBOOK 4 (1989).
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omission, as a large percentage of the problems, lawsuits, and disruptions
caused by nondisclosure have occurred when information known to the
agency about the child's history, particularly relating to psychological
disorders, was not transmitted to the adoptive family. 26 Section 2-106(a)
sets out in detail the information that the child's history must include:
1. "[A]n account of the minor's prenatal care, medical condition
at birth, any drug or medication taken by the minor's mother
during pregnancy." Prenatal history and the history of labor,
delivery, and neonatal evaluation are essential to risk assessment,
diagnosis, and treatment of many subsequent problems 27 Knowl-
edge of the consumption of drugs or medication during pregnancy
can also alert health-care professionals to certain risks.28 While
alcohol was probably intended by the UAA drafters to be included
as a drug in this category, or to be reported under "addiction
to drugs or alcohol" in section 2-106(a)(2), states may wish to
specifically add "or alcoholic consumption" after "medication
taken" in section 2-106(a)(1), to facilitate assessment of the risk
of fetal alcohol syndrome. Presence of this syndrome is confirmed
only by accurate information about the quantity and nature of
the alcohol that the mother consumed during pregnancy. 9While
specific reference to this in the statute is no guarantee of the
accuracy of the response, it may at least ensure that the proper
questions are asked. Information regarding any exposure by the
birth mother during her pregnancy to toxic substances, fumes,
or occupational hazards that could affect the health of the child,
and the timing during the pregnancy of the exposure should also
be included on the medical history form. States might consider
adding a specific reference to this type of information in the statute
or implementing regulations to ensure its inclusion.
30
2. "Any subsequent medical, psychological, orpsychiatric examina-
tion and diagnosis, and. . . a record of any immunizations and
26. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text. See generally ADOPTION LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at §§ 16.02, .03, .04 (describing the factual bases of
the many lawsuits that have been filed against adoption intermediaries for nondisclosure
of health information).
27. See Don Hadley & Barbara Petterson, Family History Workshop, in GENETIC
FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 100, 108; Renata Laxova, MinorSigns ofMajorProb-
lems, in Genetic Family History, supra note 9, at 69, 72; American Academy of Pediat-
rics Comm. on Early Childhood, Adoption, and Dependent Care, InitialMedicalEvalua-
tion of an Adopted Child, Publ. No. RE 9219, 88 PEDIATRICS 642 (1991).
28. See American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 27, at 643.
29. Laxova, supra note 27, at 72. Fetal alcohol syndrome, caused by consumption
of alcohol during pregnancy, can cause neurological damage to the infant, which may
include growth retardation, developmental delay, a small head, and particular facial
characteristics. Id.
30. Hadley & Petterson, supra note 27, at 108.
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health care received while in foster care or other care." Over
half of all children adopted through domestic unrelated adoption
in the United States are over two years of age and over a fourth
of these are special needs adoptions." When these children change
caregivers by moving to an adoptive family, it is essential that
their complete medical and psychological records travel with them
to ensure continuity of care and to facilitate future assessment.32
Even for infants, transmission of the infant's complete medical
records is essential. One newborn who went straight to his adop-
tive home from the hospital suffered irreversible brain damage
because information on the status of his phenylketonuria testing
was not effectively communicated.33
3. "Any physical, sexual, or emotional abuse suffered by the minor
... ; information concerning a judicial order terminating the pa-
rental rights of a parent, and a proceeding in which the parent
was alleged to have abused, neglected, abandoned, or otherwise
mistreated the minor, a sibling of the minor or the other parent. "
Information about prior abuse and neglect is critical to ensuring
that a child receives proper diagnosis and treatment when subse-
quent mental, emotional, or behavioral problems develop. 34 Re-
cent litigation suggests that this type of information frequently
has been withheld in the past, with devastating consequences for
the child, who failed to receive effective therapy for the emotional
and psychological scars created by the abuse he suffered or wit-
nessed, and for the families who were totally unprepared to cope
with the resulting behavior disorders. It is therefore crucial that
this information be specifically required in the statute.
31. Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, in ADOPrION,
supra note 17, at 29.
32. The primary drafter of the UAA, Professor Joan Hollinger, aptly referred to
this information as the child's "medical passport." Telephone interview with Joan
Hollinger (Jan. 8, 1996). See generally American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note
27, at 643.
33. See Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 971-72 (Miss. 1990).
34. Psychologists are developing increasingly effective therapies for abused chil-
dren, but proper implementation is aided by specific knowledge of the abuse. See John
W. Mclnturf, Preparing Special Needs Children for Adoption Through Use of a Life
Book, 65 CHILD WELFARE 373, 376, 378, 381 (1986). See also BARTH & BERRY, supra
note 8, at 15 (observing that a child's history of abuse is critical to pre-adoption assess-
ment); Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 81 (A history of physical and particularly sexual
abuse prior to adoption is a key predictor of increased risk for adoption disruption.).
35. See, e.g. , Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994) (failureto disclose significant
history of physical and sexual abuse; subsequent to adoption child required permanent
institutionalization for violent behavior); Reidy v. Albany County Dep't of Social Ser-
vices, 598 N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y. App. 1993) (adopted son, with history of prior sexual
abuse unknown to parents, molested sibling); Forter v. County of San Mateo, Case No.
332 087, California Superior Court, San Mateo County, (settled in July 1992 for $1.45
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4. "Information concerning a criminal conviction or delinquency
adjudication of the minor." While it may seem odd to discuss
this requirement in the context of the child's medical history,
information regarding criminal behavior by the child can provide
an important clue to the existence of undiagnosed emotional or
psychological problems, as well as an indicator to prospective
adoptive parents of the severity of behavioral problems to be
expected. Because both inadequate background information re-
garding behavioral problems and unrealistic parental expectations
are key factors that contribute to instability of an adoptive place-
ment,3 6 it is imperative that prospective adoptive parents be pro-
vided information on the child's juvenile or criminal record when
it exists. In addition, to better serve this interest, a medical or
social history report form should also contain a specific inquiry
about any behavioral problems the child has exhibited, beyond
any juvenile or criminal record of the child's that may exist.
One important category not included in the UAA, which states may
wish to consider adding to section 2-106(a)(1), is a reference to the
child's developmental history. This would include such information as
the age at which the child acquired certain basic gross motor, fine
motor, language, and cognitive skills, information which is diagnosti-
cally useful for many neurological and sensory deficit problems." 7
b. Medical History of Birth Family
Section 2-106(a) also requires a medical and psychological history
of a child's genetic parents and relatives. Information regarding any
known disease and hereditary disposition to disease and addiction to
drugs or alcohol by genetic relatives38 is specifically included within
million, parents alleged failure to disclose history of abuse and psychological treatment);
S.L. Wykes, Adoption SuitEnds in $1.45 Million Settlement, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
July 9, 1992, at IB; Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1991) (Many of the Texas families who joined this suit alleged that the
state agency withheld information about previous physical or sexual abuse experienced
by their children, which they contend delayed proper treatment for their subsequent emo-
tional problems and contributed to years of severely disturbed behavior.). See also Bel-
kin, supra note 12, at B8; Junda Woo, Adoption Suits Target Agencies for Negligence,
WALL ST. J., July 9, 1992, at 2 (Undisclosed child abuse is one of the most common
allegations in litigation against adoption agencies for nondisclosure).
36. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 80-81.
37. See generally Rae Sprague, Developmental Approach to Casefinding: Part 2,
in GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 95-99.
38. Knowledge of a history of alcoholism forewarns adoptees to be cautious about
their own alcoholic consumption. Developmental psychologist Robert Plomin observes
that it is just as important to tell an adoptee about an alcoholic birth parent as it is to
disclose a history of genetic diseases. Adoptees who know of alcoholism in the family,
he observes, and who see symptoms of alcoholism developing, are more likely to get
help early. Franklin, supra note 6, at 41.
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this category, as is information regarding the health of the birth mother
and the health of each parent at the time of birth. The vast majority
of current state disclosure statutes do require collection and disclosure
of some medical history of the birth parents.39 It is important, however,
that these statutes specify that psychological history be included, since
this appears to be another area that has been susceptible to nondisclosure
in the past and has generated much litigation. 40 Moreover, many states
currently neglect to require collection of health information regarding
other biological relatives ,4 ' as the UAA would mandate. This is a dan-
gerous oversight, as many medical problems skip generations or may
not be apparent from the medical histories of birth parents, who are
themselves often young at the time of the birth.42
States may wish to specifically include in their statutes a reference
to information about whether the birth parents are related to each other.
39. Blair, supra note 21, at 735, n.285.
40. See Zernhelt v. Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services, 659
A.2d 89 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (failure to disclose history of mental illness of both
parents); Juman v. Louise Wise Services, 211 A.2d 446, 620 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995) (failure to disclose severe psychiatric problems of birth mother);
Mallette v. Children's Friend and Service, 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995) (failure to disclose
birth mother's macrocephaly, retardation, and genetic history); Mohr v. Common-
wealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995) (failure to disclose birth mother's schizophrenia
and institutionalization); Burr v. Board of County Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d 1101
(Ohio 1986) (failure to disclose birth mother's mental health history and institutionaliza-
tion); Kreuger v. Leahy, Case No. 89L 18751 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Illinois, filed
Dec. 28, 1989) (failure to disclose birth parents' institutionalization); Paul Marcotte,
Wrongful Adoption, Couple Sues Agency for Hiding Adoptive Son's Background,
A.B.A. J. 22 (April 1990). For accounts of additional litigation, see Fernau, supra
note 5, at 1 (The Waags, an adoptive family in Arizona, sued Catholic Family and
Community Services for failure to disclose birth mother's history of retardation, depres-
sion, multiple personalities, hyperactivity, and institutionalization, and the Taegers
sued the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix for the agency's failure to disclose a
birth mother's mental illness); Andrew Fegelman, Suit Accuses Jewish Social Service
Agency of Adoption Fraud, Chi. Trib., Feb. 10, 1993, at 1 (failure to disclose birth
mother's psychiatric problems and hospitalization). See also Woo, supra note 35, at
2 ("Next to undisclosed child abuse, adoption lawsuits most commonly allege that an
agency didn't disclose genetic disorders.").
41. For examples of current state disclosure statutes that fail to require health
information on any biological relatives other than the birth parents, see, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 26-10A-19 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-2 (West Supp. 1995); MD.
CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-328 (1991); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West
Supp. 1995).
42. For information on generation-skipping conditions, see Reiser, supra note 20,
at 65-66. See Meracle v. Children's Servs. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989) (an
adopted child whose birth father was only a teen at the time of her birth and had
not yet exhibited the symptoms of Huntington's Disease, which the child ultimately
contracted). While many genetic diseases are relatively rare, information on the history
of more common diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes within a family
have significant health planning benefits for an adoptee.
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Children of incestuous relationships have an increased risk of geneti-
cally inherited disorders,43 and information of this nature has been
withheld, at least to some degree, in the past."
c. Social History
An important requirement, and one often omitted, is the UAA's
mandate that information be collected on the social history of the child,
and the child's birth parents and relatives. Specific instructions are
given by section 2-106 to include information regarding the child's
past and existing relationships with anyone with whom the child has
regularly lived or visited. The more knowledgeable the adoptive parents
are about relationships that were and are important to the child, the
better they can facilitate an older child's adjustment into the new family
and support the child through the grieving process the child may undergo
for birth family or foster family members. In appropriate circum-
stances, adoptive parents may wish to facilitate continuing contact with
foster parents or birth relatives with whom the child desires to maintain
a relationship. As an adolescent, an adoptee may desire this information
as he or she works through identity development. Moreover, informa-
tion concerning all previous foster and adoptive placements should be
routinely provided to prospective adoptive parents so that they are fully
informed of all factors affecting their own risk assessment.45
It is also essential to specifically require, as does section 2-106(a),
information concerning a child's "enrollment and performance in
school, the results of any educational testing, and any special education
needs." This information will facilitate appropriate educational place-
ment once the child is in the adoptive home and help ensure special
education needs are adequately addressed. Current disclosure statutes,
often drafted with infants in mind, often fail to include reference to
educational records. Information about the child's talents, hobbies, and
special interests would also be useful information to collect through
the child's social history form.
Although information regarding the social history of the birth family
may be perceived by some as less essential, it is extremely important
43. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 27, at 643. See also Black, supra
note 19, at 194-95; Lamport, supra note 10, at 114.
44. See M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992) (agency
revealed incest in family background but allegedly failed to reveal birth parents were
siblings).
45. The number of previous placements is one predictor of adoption disruption.
In addition, a child who has experienced one adoption disruption is at an increased
risk for subsequent disruption. Rosenthal, supra note 17, at 79, 81; BARTH & BERRY,
supra note 8, at 72, 156-57.
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to fostering an adoptee's sense of identity, which is critical to healthy
emotional development.46 Moreover, information regarding the child's
racial, ethnic, and religious background, as well as a general description
of the birth parents, can have future diagnostic significance, 7 in addition
to enhancing a sense of identity. Information on tribal affiliation, also
required by section 2-106, is relevant to legal concerns regarding the
Indian Child Welfare Act, but also will assist adoptees who may later
wish to seek the benefits of tribal membership.4" Information on "the
level of educational and vocational achievement of the minor's parents
and relatives and any noteworthy accomplishments," may contribute
to the adoptee's self esteem, and in any event, combat the sense of
"genealogical bewilderment" some adoptees experience. 49
One item of social history that enacting states may wish to consider
revising slightly is the reference in section 2-106(a)(4) to "information
concerning a criminal conviction of a parent for a felony. . . . 50 To
the extent this reference is intended only to include felonies related to
abuse or neglect by the birth parent of the child placed for adoption
or a sibling or other birth parent, it is certainly appropriate, as discussed
above.5 If it is intended to include all felonies, it may be overbroad.
Some types of felony convictions would be relevant to other categories
of information the act sets out, such as parental use of drugs or alcohol.
Psychological impairment that produced the criminal behavior would
be part of the parents' medical history. Inclusion of criminal convictions
that are unrelated to the child or the child's development, however,
may create a risk of stigmatization and identity problems for the adoptee
that outweigh any benefits that might be gained.
46. See Black, supra note 19, at 203-05; Whitehouse, supra note 9, at 20.
47. Hadley & Petterson, supra note 27, at 103, 104. For example, Tay Sachs
disease is prevalent among those of Jewish ancestry, cystic fibrosis is most common
among Caucasians, sickle cell anemia most frequently afflicts African Americans, and
spinal bifida occurs more frequently among those of Jewish descent. Extremely tall
or short height of the birth parents may be a clue of a genetic disorder. Id.
48. Alaska currently requires collection and disclosure of information on tribal
membership of birth parents. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1994). Tribal member-
ship of other ancestors may also provide an adoptee with important information about
her heritage.
49. This term has been used in psychological literature to describe symptoms
associated with identity conflict on the part of some adoptees, caused by their lack of
knowledge about the medical, social, and ethnic background of their birth families.
The term was originally used by H.J. Sants, who described it as a state of confusion and
uncertainty in adoptees who had become obsessed with questions about their biological
roots. H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 87
BRIT. MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 133-41 (1964). See In re Assalone, 512 A.2d. 1383,
1388, n.5 (R.I. 1986) (summarizing testimony by expert witness Dr. Brandon Qualls);
CAPLAN, supra note 4, at 82; SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 5, at 113.
50. See U.A.A. § 2-106(a)(5), Appendix B.
51. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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When preparing a form for the collection of this social history, the
drafters may wish to consider requesting information about the circum-
stances leading to the adoption. This will help adoptive parents better
understand and cope with any resulting problems an older adopted child
may experience and better prepare adoptive parents to deal with the
inevitable questions that even those adopted as infants will ultimately
pose. The form should require not only the age of the adopted child,
but also the ages of the birth parents, other children of either birth
parent, and the birth grandparents at the time of the adoption, as well
as the gender of the other children of either birth parent. Nonidentifying
information about the existence of the extended family of the birth
parents and grandparents should also be included, so that the adoptee
in later years will have a sense of his or her biological roots, which
is important whether or not the adoptee ultimately desires to pursue a
reunion with any of these birth relatives.
d. Information Necessary to Determine Eligibility for Subsidies
An important provision of section 2-106(a) is the final mandate bridg-
ing several of the categories described above, to provide "information
necessary to determine the minor's eligibility for state or federal bene-
fits, including subsidies for adoption and other financial, medical, or
similar assistance." Inspired by Texas' disclosure statute, 52 which has
contained a similar provision for many years, this requirement reminds
the agencies and attorneys responsible for collection and disclosure of
medical and social history of their obligation to ensure that prospective
adoptive families be provided with all of the information they need to
apply for such assistance." Adoption assistance benefits play a vital
role in facilitating the adoption of special needs children. 54 The failure to
provide adequate information can needlessly delay or subvert a family's
eligibility for benefits that would otherwise enable a child to receive
appropriate medical care and provide the family with social services
that offer much needed support."
52. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.007 (West Supp. 1996).
53. Adoption assistance benefits may include the payment of nonrecurring adoption
expenses, regular cash payments, medical assistance, and social services such as respite
care, specialized day care, and counseling, and are funded through federal programs
under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and through state programs.
For an in depth discussion of these programs, see ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 4, at ch. 9.
54. Id. at § 9.01(1).
55. In general adoptive parents cannot negotiate for federal benefits after an adop-
tion is completed. However, parents are allowed to establish benefits retroactively if
they can establish that they were not provided with accurate information about their
child's condition or the availability of adoption assistance prior to finalization of the
adoption decree. Some states also permit application for state adoption assistance after
finalization, on the basis of preexisting conditions that were unknown to the prospective
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2. COLLECTION PROCESS
The UAA, like the majority of current state statutory disclosure
schemes, does not provide a great deal of direction regarding the collection
process itself, perhaps leaving this topic to implementing regulations.
Because the collection process is so crucial, states may wish to consider
carefully codifying more detailed standards for this investigation.56
a. Forms
Section 2-106(f) provides that an appropriate state department57 shall
be responsible for prescribing and distributing a form to collect the
medical and social history information. Paradoxically, the Child Wel-
fare League of America has criticized this provision as unduly burden-
some for a state department.5 8 This criticism is misplaced. Collection of
comprehensive, accurate information, particularly concerning genetic
conditions about which lay people may not be knowledgeable, will be
facilitated by the development of a uniform written form that can be
used statewide. Each state can designate the department that is best
suited to this task. In all likelihood, it will be the department that is
responsible for oversight of public adoptive placement within the state.
While there is no denying that development or revision of a form can
be time-consuming, in all likelihood these departments are already
charged with this task for their own adoptions.59 Moreover, preparation
of the most difficult portion of the form, that dealing with medical and
genetic history, has been greatly facilitated by the creation of a detailed
Model Medical/Genetic Family History Form for Adoptions by the
Education Committee, Genetics and Adoption Subcommittee of the
Council of Regional Networks of Genetics Services (CORN), which
is available upon request6° and can be incorporated into the state's form.
adoptive parents prior to finalization. Id. at § 9.04(6). Nevertheless, experts caution
that "in most cases, it is essential that prospective adoptive parents explore their child's
eligibility for adoption assistance before finalizing the adoption." Id.
56. See OHIo REV. CODE § 3107.12 (Baldwin 1994) (example of a disclosure
statute that does codify standards for the investigation in unusual detail).
57. U.A.A. § 1-101 allows each state to pick the appropriate department, such
as a Department of Social Services, a Department of Health Services, or a Department
of Children's Services.
58. Child Welfare League of America, Analysis of the Proposed Uniform Adoption
Act, 6-7.
59. For example, in Oklahoma, the Department of Human Resources is already
required to prepare a referral packet of social, psychological, educational, medical,
and legal documents, and Affidavits of Information Disclosure. Okla. Dep't of Human
Services Reg. 340:75-15-60, -61.
60. This model form, completed in September 1994, contains a cover sheet for
identifying information and then separate sections for obtaining information on the
delivery and birth of the child, a medical/genetic family history from the birth mother,
and a medical/genetic family history from the birth father. Copies can be obtained by
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Agencies and intermediaries who desire even more detailed information
than the state's uniform form should be allowed to supplement the
standard form with additional pages.
b. Responsibility for Collection
Complete and accurate collection of medical and social history would
be facilitated if states would define in their disclosure statutes the qualifi-
cations required for the person writing the medical history.6' Section
2-106(a) of the UAA appropriately puts responsibility upon the agency,
when the adoption is handled by an agency, to furnish the written report
with the medical and social background information the statute requires.
Agencies have professional personnel who are already trained to handle
difficult interpersonal situations62 and who have access to continuing
education programs that can provide specialized training that will facili-
tate the collection of technical information, an outcome anticipated by
the Comment to section 2-106.63 The Act would be strengthened if
adopting states codify or include in their implementing regulations a
requirement, or at least a recommendation that, whenever feasible, the
information be collected by professional employees who have received
this specialized training. 64
One drawback of section 2-106(a) is that in direct placement (i.e., non-
agency) adoptions, the duty to furnish, and hence to collect, the informa-
tion is on the "person placing the minor for adoption," which would be,
contacting Joan Burns, M.S., M.S.S.W., Subcommittee Chair, Wisconsin Clinical
Genetics Center, 1500 Highland Avenue, Room 331, Madison, Wisconsin 53706;
608/263-5611.
61. The National Council for Adoption, in its position paper on the 1994 UAA,
identifies as one weakness of the Act the "lack of definition of qualifications of the
person writing the history." National Council for Adoption, What Is the Uniform
Adoption Act and What Does It Do?, 1 (1994).
62. See Plumridge et al., supra note 18, at 213 (collection of genetic information
"is a refinement of already existing social work skills and can be enhanced through
specialized training").
63. "These provisions will encourage the development of protocols-like those
being drafted by the American Academy of Pediatrics in cooperation with child welfare
agencies and attorneys-for collecting information in a non-intrusive manner that re-
spects individual privacy. These provisions will also encourage better training of medi-
cal personnel, social workers, and genetic counselors who are called upon to assist
prospective adoptive parents in evaluating the needs of minor adoptees." Comment
on U.A.A. § 2-106.
64. Carol Amadio, Wrongful Adoption-A New BasisforLitigation: Another Chal-
lenge for Child Welfare, J.L. & Soc. WORK 23 (Mar. 1989) (concluding that all
adoption agency personnel responsible for placement in a direct or supervisory capacity
must receive "routine instruction through staff development programs and in written
policy guidelines on the importance of' disclosure and appropriate disclosure proce-
dure).
444 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 2, Summer 1996
according to section 2-101, the child's parent or a guardian expressly
authorized by the court to place the child. 6 The drafters of the UAA faced
a dilemma, because the Act permits some types of assistance by a lawyer,
a health-care provider, an agency, or another person in direct placement
adoptions, but does not require such assistance. 66 Unfortunately, placing
responsibility upon a birth parent will be ineffective. Birth parents lack
proper training and, quite appropriately, are not subject to the enforce-
ment provisions of the Act. 67 In order to ensure that the collection respon-
sibility will be delegated to a skilled professional who can be held ac-
countable, states should place ultimate responsibility for collection in
direct placement adoptions upon the attorney, physician, or licensed so-
cial worker who assists as an adoption intermediary in the manner permit-
ted by state law,68 or if there is no such intermediary, upon the attorney
who represents the petitioners for adoption. 69 Attorneys, physicians, and
social workers are all licensed by the state, and subject to a professional
65. U.A.A. § 2-101(a).
66. See U.A.A. § 2-102(b) & (c).
67. U.A.A. § 7-105 provides for penalties for anyone, other than a parent, who
intentionally refuses to provide information, and creates civil liability for anyone who
fails to perform the duties required by U.A.A. § 2-106.
68. If a state enacts this portion of the UAA, the assistance permitted by an adoption
intermediary will be governed by section 2-102(b) & (c). See supra note 66. Currently,
direct private placement of children with unrelated prospective adopted parents is permit-
ted in the District of Columbia and in every state except four: Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, and Massachusetts. See ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 3.04,
at 28 (Cum. Supp. 1995). State laws currently vary tremendously in the scope of assis-
tance non-agency adoption intermediaries are permitted to provide. See ADOPTION LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, §§ 3.04[3], 5.01 to .14, 6.02 to .04.
69. Nonagency adoption intermediaries are typically attorneys or physicians. Some
states, however, permit ministers and other persons to act as intermediaries. See ADOP-
TION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at § 3.04[3]. The UAA itself permits any
person or entity to act as an intermediary. See supra note 66, U.A.A. §§ 2-102(b),
2-101(11) (defining "person" as "an individual, corporation, limited liability com-
pany, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, agency, joint venture, gov-
ernment, governmental subdivision or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other
legal or commercial entity"). While attorneys, physicians, and social workers have
access to the training necessary to effectively collect medical history, other types of
intermediaries may not. In these instances, and when no one is acting as an "intermedi-
ary," it would be preferable to have the responsibility for collection and disclosure
of medical information delegated by statute to the attorney representing the adoptive
parents in the adoption proceeding. Ultimately, this attorney's professional duty to
her clients should include ensuring that an appropriate medical investigation has been
completed and that full disclosure has been made to her clients. Therefore, the attorney
for the adoptive parents is a logical candidate for undertaking the collection responsibil-
ity in the absence of an agency or other appropriate intermediary. See Kaye McLeod,
Private Placement Adoptions, 28 FALL ARK. LAW 46, 50 (1994) ("A careful lawyer
should thoroughly disclose the biological parent's available medical background.");
Raymond W. Godwin & Kenneth Biedzynski, Liability for Wrongful Adoption Looms
Health Disclosure Provisions 445
code of conduct. Attorneys and social workers have access to specialized
training for adoption through continuing education programs. Physi-
cians, who would already have the medical expertise necessary to prop-
erly collect the history, could receive training about the legal require-
ments through medical professional training networks. As with agency
adoptions, the statute or implementing regulations should require train-
ing appropriate for the type of profession involved, and should limit the
professional intermediary's ability to delegate the collection responsibil-
ity if the attorney, physician, or social worker does not herself collect
the information and prepare the report. A trained paralegal, a licensed
social worker under contract, or a trained nurse in a physician's office
might all have acceptable qualifications to collect the information for the
intermediary.
c. Actions in Which Collection is Required
The UAA clearly specifies that the collection and disclosure require-
ments apply in both agency and nonagency adoptions. It is less clear
that they apply to stepparent adoptions, which are covered by a separate
article in the UAA, Article 4, that does not specifically reference medi-
cal background information. Concerns about an adoptive parent making
an "informed choice" in stepparent or other adoptions by relatives
may be less compelling, as familial connection often motivates these
adoptions. Nevertheless, important considerations remain for collecting
the medical and social background information regarding any parent
whose rights will be terminated in any adoption, and their biological
relatives. Although the spouse of a prospective adoptive stepparent
would know the child's history and his or her own history, that parent's
knowledge of the terminated parent's medical and genetic history may
be incomplete. Since the adoption will terminate one parent's parental
rights, and may terminate the right to visitation,7° the adopted child
Large, N.J. L.J., Sept. 12, 1991, at 7 (expressing opinion that attorneys representing
adoptive parents in agency adoption could invite claims of legal malpracitce if they fail
to ensure the agency's medical report complies with statutory disclosure requirements);
DAVID LEAVITT, COUNSELING CLIENTS IN INDEPENDENT ADoPTIONs 25-26 (1980)
(emphasizing importance of obtaining complete health history from both birth parents
for prospective adoptive parents, as part of role of counsel in nonagency adoption);
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at § 6.04[2][ii] (discussing role of
attorney for adoptive parents in private placement adoption, including importance of
obtaining background information). Only as a last resort, in cases in which there is
no agency or professional intermediary, and in which the adoptive parents are not
represented by counsel, should the duty to collect and furnish information be placed
upon the person placing the child for adoption.
70. Visitation rights of a parent whose rights have otherwise been terminated in
a stepparent adoption can be preserved under the Act only by agreement under limited
circumstances. See U.A.A. § 4-113.
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may lose contact with that birth parent and his or her relatives, and
thus lose access to important genetic information. In other types of
relative adoptions, the adoptive parents may be unfamiliar with the
medical and genetic history of the "other" side of the child's birth
family. While collection and disclosure requirements could be tailored
by statute to exclude history of the stepparents' spouse, collection and
disclosure statutes should not exclude stepparent or other relative adop-
tions altogether.
Although the scope of the UAA was limited to adoption actions,
states may wish to consider requiring the collection of medical and
social history in all juvenile actions in which termination of parental
rights could be an ultimate disposition. Children who ultimately become
available for adoption through involuntary termination have often lived
with at least one birth parent for a substantial period of time, so birth
parents have crucial information about the child's own health history,
in addition to their own medical and social histories. Cooperation in
the collection process may be far easier to obtain in the early stages
of a juvenile proceeding than at a time subsequent to termination when
an adoption is taking place.7 l Moreover, collection of health history
in all juvenile proceedings would ensure that this information would
be subsequently available for the thousands of children who become
available for adoption, but are never adopted. 72 However, because sec-
tion 2-106(e) provides a use immunity for information furnished as part
of the medical and social history,73 it might be wise to delay collection of
any information that could be related to the termination action until
the prosecution has gathered the evidence to be used in the juvenile
proceeding, so that the termination action is not affected by the collec-
tion of medical and social history. If information is difficult to collect
from a parent subject to termination of rights in an adoption proceeding,
section 2-106(c) provides that the court may request such a parent to
supply the medical and social history information needed.74
71. Social workers are instructed that the best time to get information may be
upon initial contact with the agency, when a parent often depends upon the agency
for a favorable report or a service, or at the time of initial contact with the court
system, when the parent's fear of the legal proceedings may motivate cooperation.
Diane Knight, Working With the Resistant or Reticent Client Workshop, in GENETIC
FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 56.
72. One study in Michigan, for example, found that of 134 children who became
available for adoption during a three month period in 1987, 52 (39%) had still not
been adopted four years later in July of 1991. Binsfield Commission Report, supra
note 17, at 40.
73. See U.A.A. § 2-106(e), Appendix B.
74. See U.A.A. § 2-106(c), Appendix B.
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d. Manner of Collection
Section 2-106(a) requires that the written report on background infor-
mation must contain all information "reasonably available from any
person who has had legal or physical custody of the minor or who has
provided medical, psychological, educational or similar services to
the minor." The Comment to section 7-105 explains that the Act's
requirement to "provide background information that is 'reasonably
available' is intended to create a statutory duty to use reasonable efforts
to obtain the information and to disclose the information that is collected
to prospective adoptive parents. 75 This legislative history is critical,
because establishing a "duty to use reasonable efforts" better conveys
the responsibility of the adoption agency or intermediary to actively
seek out the required information as opposed to passively recording
whatever information is offered. Verifying the existence of this duty will
deter any temptation on the part of an adoption agency or intermediary to
take a "see no evil, hear no evil, say no evil" approach, perhaps out
of a misplaced concern that the less information they possess, the less
they are obligated to disclose, and an erroneous belief that their risk
of potential liability for negligent misrepresentation might somehow
be minimized. Passive collection efforts obviously thwart the intended
goal of the statute, which is to promote the collection of accurate and
complete background information. State legislatures should consider
establishing the "duty to use reasonable efforts" to obtain information
in the statute itself, or in implementing regulations. At the very least,
it should be incorporated in legislative comments or other legislative
history, so that the meaning of "reasonably available" intended by the
drafters of the UAA does not get overlooked by those attempting to
comply with the Act or by courts later interpreting it.
The drafters of the UAA prudently subverted financial burden as an
excuse for half-hearted collection efforts. Section 7-104, which regu-
lates charges and fees by an agency, permits an agency to "charge
or accept a fee or other reasonable compensation from a prospective
adoptive parent for. . . expenses incurred in ascertaining the informa-
tion required by Section 2-106. . . ." Similarly, section 7-103, which
regulates lawful payments related to adoption, permits nonagency ser-
vice providers to be paid for these expenses.
What do reasonable efforts include? Section 2-106 is far more com-
prehensive than most existing state statutes in its description of the
persons from whom information must be sought. It requires obtaining
information from anyone who has had legal or physical custody of the
75. U.A.A. § 7-105, Comment.
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child and anyone who has provided medical, psychological, educa-
tional, or similar services to the child. Information from birth parents,
foster parents, or others who have had physical or legal custody should
be obtained by personal interview7 6 conducted by someone trained to
collect the information.77 Trained professionals in an interview can ask
follow-up questions and, by explaining the importance of particular
information as well as confidentiality and immunity provisions, they
may overcome an initial reluctance to disclose. Such explanations can
be performed far more effectively in person than in print.78
Reasonable efforts should also include obtaining a copy of all of the
child's medical, psychological, and educational records. Obtaining a
consent authorizing the release of these records from a parent or legal
guardian should not be difficult when the parent or legal custodian
voluntarily relinquishes a child for adoption. Children adopted follow-
ing involuntary termination are normally in state custody, so the release
could be signed by the appropriate state official. However, for the rare
circumstances in which releases cannot otherwise be obtained, states
may wish to include in their disclosure statutes a provision authorizing
release of all of the child's medical and educational records to an agency
placing a child for adoption, or to the attorney for petitioners for adop-
tion in the case of direct placement adoptions. The agency or intermedi-
ary should retain one copy of the records for their files, and provide
the prospective adoptive parents with a copy of all of the records, with
identifying information redacted, if necessary, in closed adoptions.
Collection of medical, social, and genetic history directly from a
birth father, preferably through personal interview, as well as from
the birth mother, is important if complete and accurate information is
to be obtained. Although section 2-106 mandates the collection and
disclosure of medical and social information concerning both birth par-
ents and their relatives, its provision that the information be obtained
from persons who have had legal or physical custody could be miscon-
strued to suggest that information regarding putative birth fathers, who
may never have had physical or legal custody, would be obtained only
76. The drafters of the Model Medical/Genetic Family History Form for Adoption
indicate on the cover page that "it would be optimal if each birth parent was assisted
in completing the questionnaires by a trained professional worker who appreciates the
importance of collecting the information and has an awareness of the medical and
genetic conditions contained in the form." See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Requiring a personal interview is strongly recommended by another social work profes-
sional who provides training to adoption social workers in Wisconsin. Thomas J. Mick,
Social Work Practice Issues, GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 9, at 34.
77. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
78. See Mick, supra note 76, at 34; Knight, supra note 71, at 57-58.
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from the birth mother or the child's medical care providers. This clearly
was not the intent of the drafters of the UAA. In section 3-404,79 the
Act requires that a birth mother who is not forthcoming about the
identity or whereabouts of the possible father must be advised, among
other things, that "the lack of information about the father's medical
and genetic history may be detrimental to the adoptee," advice that
clearly implies that this information is to be obtained directly from the
father.
An often sensitive and difficult issue is the question of when the
medical and social background information should be obtained from
the birth father of a child born out of wedlock who is voluntarily placed
for adoption by the birth mother, without the birth father's direct partici-
pation. In most cases it is desirable for the birth father's medical and
social history to be collected in sufficient time prior to the birth or
placement to facilitate placement planning by the agency or intermedi-
ary and the adoptive parents. If information exists in the father's history
which could adversely affect some prospective adoptive parent's deci-
sion to adopt a particular child, it is in the child's interest for this to
be known as early as possible so that a stable placement can be made
with prospective adoptive parents who have made an informed choice
to adopt the child. Particularly in cases in which a birth father executes
a pre-birth disclaimer of interest under section 2-402, or some similar
pre-birth consent,8 ' medical and social history should be obtained from
the birth father prior to or at the time consent is given, if at all possible,
because the birth father may be difficult to locate, resistant to further
contact, or find the contact distressing after the consent is given.
In some instances, however, a birth mother will oppose contacting
the birth father prior to the birth and placement, out of fear the birth
father may harass or abuse her.82 An agency or intermediary should
have the discretion to obtain the information the birth mother knows
79. See U.A.A. § 3-404, Investigation and Notice to Unknown Father.
80. U.A.A. § 2-402(a)(4).
81. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.106 (1996) (permits a birth father to sign
a pre-birth affidavit disclaiming interest in the child, which waives a right to notice
and may be used as a basis to terminate parental rights in an adoption proceeding).
See also MICH. Comp. LAWS. ANN. § 710.34 (West Supp. 1995) (birth father served
with a pre-birth notice of intent to release child or consent to child's adoption must
file a notice of intent to claim paternity; failure to do so waives right to notice and
will result in termination of his rights in an adoption proceeding). Cf IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-3-1-6.4 (Supp. 1995) (permits pre-birth notice to birth father of possible adoption,
and implies father's consent if father fails to file a paternity action within 30 days
after receiving actual notice).
82. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, in ADOrION, supra note 17, at
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about the birth father's medical history at an early stage, and postpone
collection of medical and social history directly from the birth father
in appropriate cases, particularly when the birth mother fears abuse,
until after the notice of the adoption proceedings is given to the birth
father.
The terms of the UAA would appear to permit this flexibility. Section
2-106(a) provides that all information reasonably available from a legal
or physical custodian of the child or a medical provider be furnished
to prospective adoptive parents "as early as practicable before a pro-
spective adoptive parent accepts physical custody" of the child, and
further requires that, prior to a hearing on the petition for adoption,
prospective adoptive parents be given a supplemental report with infor-
mation that became available since the initial disclosure and place-
ment.83 Sections 3-401,84 3-40485 and 3-70386 require that notice be
given prior to the hearing on the petition to all putative fathers, including
anyone who claims to be or is named as a father or possible father,
and any previously "unknown father" about whom the court learns
during the pendency of the adoption. Thus, in situations in which the
agency or intermediary determines, due to a birth mother's fear of
abuse or harassment, that it is appropriate to delay efforts to directly
collect information from the birth father until after he has received
notice, that information could be included in the supplemental report.
The UAA has been criticized for its failure to force birth mothers
to reveal the identity or whereabouts of the father.8 7 Although the criti-
cism is usually raised in the context of concern for the constitutional
rights of the father or the finality of the decree, it could clearly be
raised in the context of collection of medical and social information.
Obviously, the inability to find the actual birth father prevents collection
of medical and social history from him.
Certainly, birth mothers have on occasion refused to identify or help
locate a birth father, or have misidentified the birth father.88 The UAA
recognizes the problem by requiring that anyone claiming to be or
83. See U.A.A. § 2-106(a), Appendix B.
84. U.A.A. § 3-401, Service of Notice.
85. See U.A.A. § 3-404, Investigation and Notice to Unknown Father.
86. U.A.A. § 3-703, Granting Petition for Adoption (1994).
87. Ann Sullivan, The Uniform Adoption Act: What Price Uniformity? 4 CHIL-
DREN'S VOICE 25, 26 (1995) (also available from Child Welfare League of America);
Child Welfare League of America, Analysis of the Proposed Uniform Act, 9-10.
88. See, e.g., In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (Baby Jessica's birth
mother identified a man who was not the birth father, who initially signed the consent);
In re Petition of John Doe and Jane Doe to Adopt Baby Boy Janikova, 638 N.E.2d
181 (Ill. 1994) (Baby Richard's birth mother initially refused to reveal the name of
the birth father to the court). See also Dirk Johnson, Debate on Adoption is Focusing
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named as a father or possible father, at any time in the proceeding be
given notice, 9 and requires an investigation to identify unknown fathers
for the purpose of providing notice. 90 Section 3-404 provides for publi-
cation or posting if it is likely to lead to the receipt of notice by the
father. 9' Section 3-404 further requires that a birth mother who does
not disclose the identity or whereabouts of a possible birth father "must
be advised that the proceeding for adoption may be delayed or subject
to challenge if a possible father is not given notice of the proceeding
and that the lack of information about the father's medical and genetic
history may be detrimental to the adoption.' '92 Section 7-105(f) also
provides for civil liability for a parent who knowingly misidentifies
the other parent "with an intent to deceive the other parent, an agency,
or a prospective adoptive parent. . . ., Further "forcing" a birth
mother to disclose could presumably be done in only one of two ways:
(1) criminal sanctions for birth mothers who fail to reveal or incorrectly
name a birth father, or (2) deletions of the provisions in the UAA that
in some instances allow an adoption to be granted or remain in effect
or custody to be awarded over the objection of a "thwarted" birth
father. 94 Regarding the first alternative, there is little evidence that
criminal sanctions would be effective in forcing disclosure, and jailing
a birth mother seems a harsh and inappropriate remedy. 9' As to the
second alternative, the risk that an adoption could be prevented or
challenged is still present under the UAA and is one about which the
birth mother must be specifically counseled, in an effort to persuade
on Rights to See Family Histories, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, § 1, at 36; Hollinger,
supra note 82, at 47, 58, n.27-28 and accompanying text; ADOPTION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 4, at § 2.04[2].
89. See U.A.A. § 3-401.
90. See U.A.A. § 3-404.
91. See U.A.A. § 3-404(d).
92. See U.A.A. § 3-404(e).
93. U.A.A. § 7-105(f).
94. Under U.A.A. § 3-504, a thwarted father who failed to provide sufficient
support and visitation because he did not know of the child's existence or could not
find the birth mother can still have his rights terminated if the court finds that failure
to terminate would be detrimental to the child. U.A.A. § 3-707 provides that a decree
of adoption may not be subject to a challenge begun more that six months after the
decree is issued. U.A.A. § 3-704 provides that if a petition for adoption is denied for
any reason other than the revocation of a consent or relinquishment, custody of the
child will then be awarded according to the best interests of the child.
95. A birth father, by the act of intercourse, has some notice that conception is
possible. Many, if not all states afford him an opportunity to protect his rights through
a paternity registry or some other method that does not require the mother's cooperation.
See generally ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at § 2.04[2]. Incarcerating
a birth mother, who has undergone the pain of pregnancy, childbirth, and her own
separation from the child, is an extreme and unfair response.
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her to disclose his identity. Strengthening "thwarted fathers" rights
for the purpose of motivating a birth mother to disclose, however,
seems unlikely to be more effective than the risk the Act currently
creates. Debate about the extent to which "thwarted fathers" should be
permitted to challenge or veto, from the perspective of the constitutional
rights of those fathers, is beyond the scope of this article. As to the
effect of the UAA's "thwarted father" provisions on the collection of
medical and social history, the concern motivating those provisions,
which is to permit a child to remain in a home in which the child is
bonded and secure, is not outweighed by the slight or ephemeral chance
that more medical information would be obtained if "thwarted fathers"
rights96 were strengthened. 97
96. The CWLA, in its critique of the UAA, suggests that 'Ithe only way to
ensure that the mother's failure to name the child's father is based on a true lack of
knowledge and not other reasons is through counseling." CWLA, Analysis of the
Proposed Uniform Adoption Act 9. The UAA does provide in section 2-404(c) that
prior to execution of a consent or relinquishment a parent "must have been informed
of the meaning and consequences of adoption [and] the availability of personal and
legal counseling . . ."; U.A.A. § 2-405(d) requires that the person before whom a
consent is signed must certify that the parent "was offered counseling services and
information about the adoption." U.A.A. § 2-405(c) also provides that a parent who
is a minor "must have had access to counseling and must have had the advice of a
lawyer who is not representing the adoptive parents or the agency." U.A.A. § 2-404(c)
requires that a birth parent "must have been informed of the meaning and consequences
of adoption," and U.A.A. § 3404 requires that a birth mother who refuses to disclose
the whereabouts or identity of a birth father "must be advised that the proceeding for
adoption may be delayed or subject to challenge if a possible father is not given notice
of the proceeding and that the lack of information about the father's medical and genetic
history may be detrimental to the adoptee." CWLA is critical of these provisions
because they are not specific enough about the accessibility of the counseling, the
qualifications of the counselors, who will pay for the counseling, and how counseling
will be provided to mothers who cannot afford it. Id. at 1-2. Both adoption agencies and
attorneys representing adoptive parents have financial interests in children becoming
available for adoption, and provision for access to or information about free or low-cost
counseling from trained professionals not associated with the adoption agency or the
attorney for adoptive parents may be worth serious consideration by a legislature.
Once a birth mother has decided to place her child for adoption, however, it is not
clear why counseling from professionals who are not associated with the agency or
attorneys for the adoptive parents will be any more effective in attempting to persuade
her to reveal the birth father's name. Perhaps the concern is that the adoption agency
or attorney for the adoptive parents might be motivated to counsel a birth mother not
to divulge the father's name, out of fear he will contest the adoption. Such conduct
would be unethical if engaged in by either agency social workers or attorneys in
independent adoptions. That is why U.A.A. § 3-404(c) is so important, because it
imposes upon the court, whenever a father's identity is unknown, the responsibility
to ensure that the birth mother is advised of the negative consequences of her refusal
to disclose.
97. See Blair, supra note 21, at 743-69 (discussion in greater depth of privacy,
efficacy, and other concerns related to the collection of health information).
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B. Disclosure to Adoptive Parents
1. MANDATORY VS. DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE
Although the vast majority of state disclosure statutes currently man-
date that nonidentifying background information "shall" be furnished
to prospective adoptive parents, a few states still leave the disclosure of
medical and social history information to the discretion of the adoption
agency or other intermediary, 98 or to the discretion of the court. 99 It
is critical that disclosure of nonidentifying medical and social history
be mandatory in all states, in order to overcome the bureaucratic and
financial pressures that may tempt social workers and other facilitators
to withhold information or perform inadequate medical investiga-
tions.'00 Requiring a court order for disclosure increases legal fees and
leaves disclosure dependent upon the idiosyncracies of the judge to
whom the application is made, who may or may not have expertise on
adoption health-related issues. The UAA's section 2-106(a)'0 ' takes the
correct approach, by requiring that all reasonably available information
concerning the medical and social history of the child and the child's
birth family "shall" be furnished to prospective adoptive parents.
2. TIMING OF DISCLOSURE
One of the most important provisions of the UAA is its requirement in
section 2-106(a) that disclosure of all reasonably available background
information be made to a prospective adoptive parent "as early as
practicable" before the parent accepts physical custody of the child.1O0
Prospective adoptive parents are entitled to make an informed decision
about whether to adopt a particular child'0 3 before they and the child
98. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 924 (Supp. 1994) (permitting the department
or a licensed adoption agency to release nonidentifying information to any of the parties;
otherwise requiring a court order for release of necessary medical information); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Supp. 1995).
99. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.140 (1993).
100. The cost and effort required to obtain complete data, the financial pressure
to place special-needs children quickly in order to conserve public agency resources,
and the pressure to generate placement statistics, which affect state funding of some
public agencies and generate revenue for private agencies and other intermediaries,
all serve to tempt adoption intermediaries to disclose incomplete information. See
Blair, supra note 21, at 714-18 (in depth discussion of these pressures and the extent
of nondisclosure in the 1980s, even after most agencies endorsed full disclosure in
theory).
101. See U.A.A. § 2-106(a), Appendix B.
102. States might wish to consider including as an additional requirement the provi-
sion in Texas' statute that the medical and social history report be provided as early
as practicable before the first meeting of the adoptive parents with the child. TEX.
FAM. CODE § 162.005(e) (West Supp. 1996).
103. Comment on U.A.A. § 2-106.
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have bonded. Many current disclosure statutes require only that medical
and social history be provided prior to or upon issuance of the final
adoption decree.'14 Such late disclosure could operate to prevent a child
from receiving much needed medical treatment in the often lengthy
post placement interim and would cause substantial pain to the child
and the family if the placement is disrupted when the information is
ultimately disclosed.
Wisely, section 2-106(b) further provides that "[b]efore a hearing
on a petition for adoption, the person who placed a minor for adoption
shall furnish to the prospective adoptive parent a supplemental written
report containing information required by subsection (a) which was
unavailable before the minor was placed for adoption, but becomes
reasonably available to the person after the placement." This subsection
imposes a continuing duty upon the adoption intermediary to acquire
information not available prior to placement, which could occur on
relatively short notice to the intermediary in some circumstances. Al-
though it would be an unusual case in which information from the
relinquishing birth parent, guardian, or other custodian would not be
available prior to placement, medical records and information from
nonconsenting birth parents, other relatives, and medical personnel may
take longer to reasonably obtain in some instances. Section 2-106(b)
appropriately establishes a reasonable deadline, the hearing on the peti-
tion, for disclosing additional information which becomes available
through reasonable efforts.
3. MANNER OF DIscLosuRE
Section 2-106(a), (b), and (d) provide that the medical and social
history information required to be disclosed to prospective adoptive
parents, both prior to placement and prior to the hearing, must be
contained in a written report, which must indicate who prepared the
report. Reliance on verbal communication, particularly during the
highly emotional period for adoptive parents between the notification
that a child is available for adoption and placement, creates unnecessary
opportunities for misunderstanding and memory lapse. Providing a
written report permits the prospective adoptive parents to refer back
and reflect upon its contents, and facilitates their opportunity to seek
outside medical advice about medical risks that may have been identi-
fied. To protect the agency or other intermediary, it might be wise to
104. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-31 (West Supp. 1995); ALASKA STAT. 518 50. 510
(1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
199.520(4)(a) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342(4) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-30-17 (1995).
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include in implementing regulations a requirement that receipt of the
report should be acknowledged in writing by the prospective adoptive
parents. 105
Section 3-305 of the UAA requires that prior to the hearing on the
petition for adoption, a copy of any report containing information re-
quired by section 2-106, i.e., the medical and social history, must be
filed in the proceeding. Requiring that the court file contain a copy of
these reports will help assure adoptive parents that they will receive
complete information and protect an agency or intermediary in the
future if an issue should arise about whether certain information was
communicated.
IV. Post-Decree Retention, Collection, and Disclosure
of Health Information
Although the collection and disclosure of medical and social history
information to prospective adoptive parents is a critical issue and clearly
has generated the most litigation, it is equally important that state disclo-
sure statutes adequately address the long-term retention and post-decree
supplementation of health information and its disclosure to others with
legitimate need for the information. The UAA addresses these concerns.
A. Retention of Records
Section 6-102(d) and (e) of the UAA require that all court records
regarding an adoption, which would include the written medical and
social history reports submitted in compliance with sections 2-106 and
3-305 and any supplemental information that is added to the court
records, must be retained permanently by the court for ninety-nine
years after the date of the adoptee's birth.' 6
The UAA should impose the same requirement upon agencies and
other adoption intermediaries. The UAA implies that agencies, attor-
neys or other professional providers of adoption services will routinely
keep records of medical and social history, because the Act imposes
confidentiality restrictions upon these entities'0 7 and establishes a mech-
105. See Amadio, supra note 64, at 30 (recommending that child welfare agencies,
to avoid liability, should include in the disclosure report a place for adoptive parents
to sign acknowledging receipt, that the forms should be signed and dated by both the
disclosing social worker and the adoptive parents, and that more than one social worker
witness the disclosure process). See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.005 (West
Supp. 1996) (A petition for adoption cannot be granted until the court file contains a
copy of the medical and social history report signed by the adoptive parents).
106. U.A.A. § 6-102, Records Confidential, Court Records Sealed.
107. See U.A.A. § 6-102(e).
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anism for post-decree disclosure by agencies. 10 8 Moreover, the Act
appears to mandate the retention of information and reports by adoption
agencies concerning medical and social history through section 7-
105(b), which creates a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprison-
ment, for any employee or agent of an agency who intentionally destroys
any information or report regarding medical or social history.'09 Since
no time limit is prescribed for the agency, as is imposed upon a court
in section 6-102(d), the establishment of a misdemeanor would appear
to impose a requirement that agency records be kept indefinitely. Never-
theless, subsequent access to health-related information would be en-
hanced if the act clearly mandated permanent retention of all adoption
records, including all background and supplemental medical and social
history, by all public and private adoption agencies, private attorneys,
and any other professional providers of adoption services. This modifi-
cation could easily be made by states enacting the UAA without un-
dermining its underlying goals.
The National Association of Social Workers has criticized the UAA" °
for its failure to "mandate the keeping of records by non-agency par-
ties. " This defect is related to the broader deficiency discussed above.''
regarding the Act's delegation of responsibility for furnishing the back-
ground information in non-agency adoptions to the person placing the
child for adoption, which would be the child's parent or guardian.
Realistically, requiring birth parents or lay guardians to retain records
will be an ineffective mechanism to preserve or provide for supplemen-
tation of adoption records. While in some situations all members of
the triad may stay in contact, in those instances the need to use records
to transmit past or supplemental medical information would be obvi-
ated. In direct placement adoptions in which direct contact between
the adoptive and birth families did not occur or is not maintained, any
need to exchange information will not be accomplished by making the
birth parent the repository of the records. The Act, in fact, recognizes
108. See U.A.A. § 6-103.
109. U.A.A. § 7-105(b) makes it a misdemeanor for an employee or agent of an
agency, the court, or the State (Registrar of Vital Statistics) to intentionally destroy any
record or report compiled pursuant to U.A.A. § 2-106, which regulates the disclosure of
background information to adoptive parents, or which is authorized for release under
Article 6, which would include the nonidentifying information about the adoptee, the
adoptee's former parents, and the adoptee's genetic history that has been retained by
the agency. See U.A.A. §§ 6-103 and 7-105(b). For text of § 6-103, see Appendix
B.
110. Letter from Margaret L. Palmiter, Deputy Executive Director, National Asso-
ciation of Social Workers, to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (June 28, 1994).
111. See supra notes 61-66.
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this by acknowledging that supplemental information could be provided
to attorneys or another professional provider of services. It would be
strengthened by simply requiring that the attorney or other professional
who serves as adoption intermediary should be responsible for the
collection, disclosure, and retention of the original information and
reports and should, in addition to the court, be required to retain any
supplemental health-related information that is subsequently provided
to it. Persons who have a right to subsequent disclosure of this informa-
tion, who may have difficulty locating the court in which the adoption
took place, would then have an alternate source of information.
A third alternative source of information could be a statewide central-
ized registry, operated by whichever department would be appropriate
for the particular state. The UAA provides in section 6-106'12 for the
establishment of a statewide registry, but delegates to the registry only
the task of administering the release of identifying information. Regard-
ing nonidentifying information, the registry's task is simply to assist
individuals seeking information to locate the court or agency that would
have the records, even when the court 13 or agency is in another state. 114
This role should accomplish the goal equally well, if the agency is
required to retain records. A useful modification would be to require
the registrar to also assist individuals in locating the attorney or other
professional provider of services involved in non-agency adoptions.
To further facilitate post-decree access to health-related information,
states may wish to consider including in their statutes or implementing
regulations a provision that requires agencies, attorneys, or other pro-
fessional providers of services who cease to operate or practice to
transfer their adoption records to the department that oversees public
adoptions within the state, so that they will not be destroyed. '1
B. Supplementation of Information
Information concerning the birth parents, other children of one of
the birth parents, or other birth relatives that would have significance
for future diagnosis, medical and psychological treatment, and
112. U.A.A. § 6-106, Statewide Registry.
113. In some states there may be some concern with providing parents whose rights
have been involuntarily terminated with the location of the court in which the adoption
took place, particularly if the court is in a small county in which the child might easily
be located. Particularly states with small rural counties may wish to consider some
alternative mechanism for birth parents or relatives in such situations to obtain or file
supplemental health information without disclosing to them the location of the court.
114. See U.A.A. § 6-103(f), Appendix B.
115. An example of this type of provision is TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.006
(West Supp. 1996).
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childbearing decisions of the adoptee often surfaces after the pre-decree
investigation has been completed. Similarly, information about heredi-
tary disorders of the adoptee that are discovered after finalization might
be of critical importance to the medical treatment or childbearing deci-
sions of birth family members. States must provide appropriate mecha-
nisms for the supplementation of adoption records to enable this type
of information to be preserved and transmitted.
The UAA addresses this issue of supplementation in section 6-
102(e),"16 by requiring that -[a]ny additional information about an
adoptee, the adoptee's former parents, and the adoptee's genetic history
that is submitted to the court within the ninety-nine year period must
be added to the sealed records of the court." This section further pro-
vides that additional information that is submitted to an agency, lawyer,
or other professional provider of services must be kept confidential.
This provision could be strengthened, as discussed above, if the Act
instead required that the supplemental information be retained by the
agency, attorney, or other professional intermediary who facilitated
the adoption. If the Act is modified, as suggested above,' 7 to require
preparation of the initial medical and social history report by an attorney
or other professional in a direct placement adoption, then supplemental
information should be submitted to and retained by the attorney or
other professional provider of services who prepared the report.
Supplementation of critical medical information would be enhanced
if section 2-106 were amended to add a provision requiring the preparer
of the original report to advise the birth parents, any other persons
who submitted information for the report, and the adoptive parents that
additional information about the adoptee, the birth parents, and the
adoptee's genetic history that becomes available can be submitted to
the agency, attorney, or other person who prepared the report and, if
the location is known to them, to the clerk of the court that issues the
decree of adoption. 8 Requiring the location of the court to be released
to all birth parents or relatives who do not otherwise know it, however,
116. See U.A.A. § 6-102(c).
117. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
118. Ohio currently requires the investigator that collects the medical and social
history to "inform the biological parent, or a person other than a biological parent
who provides information. . . of the purpose and use of the histories and of his right
to correct or expand the histories at any time." OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12(d)(3)
(Baldwin 1994).
The Oklahoma legislature passed a similar provision this spring, requiring the pre-
parer of the report to advise the birth parents, others who contribute information, and
the adoptive parents that additional information may be submitted to the one who
prepared the report, or the clerk of the court. The statute specifically provides that
the location of the court is not to be revealed if it is not otherwise known. 1996 Okla.
Sess. Law Serv. ch. 297, § 4 (West), to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.5B.
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would be ill advised. Particularly when an adoption follows the involun-
tary termination of parental rights of a parent who contested the termina-
tion, as frequently happens in adoptive placements made by state agen-
cies, release of the location of the court, if the county of the adoptive
parents' residence is small, could facilitate subsequent location of the
child and create a potential for risk or harassment. "9
Finally, access to supplemental information would be enhanced if
agencies, attorneys, or other providers of professional services who
receive supplemental information were to be required by statute to file
a copy of the supplemental information with the clerk of the court that
issued the decree of adoption, so that the court records would contain
all of the information currently available. Similarly, the clerk of the
court should be authorized to release a copy of the supplemental infor-
mation filed with the court, upon request, to the agency, attorney, or
other professional provider of services who prepared the original report,
if they are required by modification of the present Act to retain their
adoption records.
C. Post-Decree Disclosure
1. WHO Is ENTITLED TO DISCLOSURE
The UAA recognizes that prospective adoptive parents are not the
only ones with a genuine need for nonidentifying information about
the medical and social history of an adoptee, the birth parents, and the
adoptee's genetic history. Section 6-103 120 permits the court that granted
the adoption or the agency that placed the child for adoption to furnish
this information upon request to "an adoptive parent or guardian of
an adoptee, an adoptee who has attained eighteen years of age, an
emancipated adoptee, a deceased adoptee's direct descendant who has
attained eighteen years of age, or the parent or guardian of a direct
descendant who has not attained 18 years of age." Information that
should be furnished includes both the reports prepared in the pre-decree
investigation pursuant to section 2-106 and any additional information
submitted to the court or the agency after finalization.
Each person entitled to disclosure under the Act has a legitimate
need for medical information. Adoptive parents would already have a
copy of the pre-decree reports, but would need access to any supplemen-
119. Employees of Oklahoma's Department of Human Services have described at
a meeting attended by this author the extensive efforts of some biological relatives to
locate children who had been placed for adoption subsequent to involuntary termination
of their parents' rights due to abuse. While access to health information is important,
it obviously cannot be accomplished in a manner that would put a child at risk.
120. U.A.A. § 6-103, Release of Nonidentifying Information. For text, see Appen-
dix B.
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tal information provided by birth relatives that might affect future diag-
nosis or treatment for their child. Guardians of the adoptee would
share the same interest and would need both the initial reports and any
supplemental information. Some states may wish to limit the right of
disclosure, however, to adoptive parents or guardians of adoptees who
are under the age of eighteen or incompetent. As Ohio has recognized
in its disclosure statutes, 121 a competent adult adoptee is responsible
for his or her own medical care and release of information to adoptive
parents of an adult may invade the privacy interests of the adoptee.
Obviously, adult adoptees and those who have been emancipated
have a critical interest in both the information in the initial reports,
which may not have been provided to them by their adoptive parents,
and in any subsequent information. Not only will the information assist
them in obtaining appropriate medical care; it may also affect their
own childbearing decisions.
An adult direct descendant of a deceased adoptee or the parent or
guardian of a minor direct descendant of a deceased adoptee have a
strong interest in information about hereditary factors or familial predis-
position to disease that could be relevant to their own medical diagnoses,
treatment, and childbearing decisions. Unlike descendants of unadopted
ancestors, the descendants of adoptees often have no access to other
biological relatives who could provide this information. On the other
hand, the UAA may be overbroad in permitting descendants access to
social history. While social history may be of interest, if the information
will not affect medical care or childbearing decisions of descendants,
the privacy interests of the deceased adoptee may outweigh descendants'
interests in information the adoptee has chosen not to share. The UAA
may also be overbroad by allowing parents or guardians of minor de-
scendants access to all medical and social history if the adoptee is still
alive. In most cases the adoptee would willingly share information
relevant to the medical care of his or her child. In situations where
that does not occur, parents or guardians of children of unadopted
persons cannot simply obtain copies of a parent's medical or psychologi-
cal records upon request. Allowing this disclosure to parents or guard-
ians of children of all adoptees without a court order invades the privacy
interests of the adoptee. 122
In two situations, however, the UAA should be modified to permit
more expansive disclosure. Under the current Act, birth parents or
121. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17(D) (Baldwin 1994) ("During the minority
of the adopted person, only the adoptive parent of the person may inspect the forms.
When an adoptee reaches majority, only he may inspect the forms.").
122. For further discussion of this issue, see Blair, supra note 21, at 687-95, 727-28.
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birth siblings are entitled to disclosure of a serious health condition of
an adoptee or the adoptee's direct descendant only if the court receives
a certified statement from a physician explaining in detail why the
condition should be disclosed to enable the parent or sibling to make
an informed reproductive decision. 12 3 When such a statement is received
the court is directed to make a diligent search to notify the birth parents
or siblings that such information is available. While requiring a search
in such circumstances is an excellent provision, biological relatives
should have access to information under broader circumstances. If an
adoptive parent or adult adoptee submits to a court, agency, or adoption
intermediary genetically significant information about the adoptee, then
obviously the adoptive family or adult adoptee wants the birth relatives
to have this information and believes it may be important to their health
or childbearing. In such circumstances, a biological parent or other
biological relative2 4 should be able to obtain this information from the
court, agency, or intermediary upon request, without requiring the
adoptive parent or adoptee to obtain a certified physician's statement.
While the statement may well be an appropriate prerequisite for the
initiation of a search, it should not be a prerequisite to simple access.
Moreover, it is appropriate to transmit information that affects the
health care of biological relatives, and not just their child bearing deci-
sions.
Another category of disclosure relates to information about people
whose birth mother's and birth father's rights were terminated and who
were never adopted. The UAA, because it was intended to address
only adoptions and not other juvenile proceedings, understandably con-
sidered this beyond the scope of the Act. Nevertheless, states enacting
the UAA can incorporate disclosure provisions that serve the needs of
this group and their families as well. 25 An adult whose parents' rights
were terminated and who was never adopted has the same need for
medical and social history that an adult adoptee has, and similarly,
often has no access to it directly from biological relatives. Foster parents
123. See U.A.A. § 6-103(c), Appendix B.
124. The American Adoption Congress has criticized the UAA for its failure to
include provisions for disclosing information to nonadopted siblings and grandparents,
as well as to spouses. American Adoption Congress, Statement in Opposition to the
Uniform Adoption Act of 1994. While privacy interests of adoptees must be respected
with regard to information released to their spouses, the disclosure to biological siblings
and grandparents of genetically significant information purposely submitted by adoptive
parents or an adult adoptee for transmission does not invoke the same privacy concerns.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the need to collect health
information regarding unadopted children whose parents' rights have been terminated).
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or other guardians of a child whose parents' rights were terminated
have a similar need for this information. The adult direct descendant
of a deceased person whose parents' rights were terminated and the
parent or guardian of a minor descendant of such a person have the
same need for medical information as do descendants of adoptees. The
biological relatives of a person whose parents' rights were terminated
also may have a legitimate need for genetically significant information.
Some states currently address the needs of this group. 
26
Finally, because supplemental information that is not submitted to
the agency or an attorney in a direct placement adoption can be filed
with the court and because even the initial reports could become lost
or accidentally destroyed, the court should be permitted to provide a
copy of all medical and social history information to the agency that
placed the child or, in a direct placement adoption, the attorney for
the adoptive parents or other professional intermediary who is retaining
records of the adoption.
2. WHO Is ENTITLED TO DISCLOSE
Currently the UAA permits only the court that granted the adoption
or the agency that placed the child to disclose even nonidentifying
information. In direct placement adoptions, the attorney for the adoptive
parents or another professional provider of services that prepared the
reports or acquired supplemental information should be permitted to
disclose it within the other guidelines imposed by the Act. 
27
3. MANNER OF DISCLOSURE
The UAA has drawn criticism 28 for its requirement that all disclosure
other than the initial pre-decree reports to prospective adoptive parents
shall be given in the form of "a detailed summary of any relevant
report or information that is included in the sealed records of the court
or the confidential records of the agency." The Act further provides
that the summary must exclude identifying information concerning an
individual who has not filed a waiver of confidentiality with the court
or agency. 29 The Act's concern for confidentiality in closed adoptions
126. See CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-743(1), -746 (West Supp. 1996); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West 1995).
127. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
128. Child Welfare League of America has objected to the fact that an adoptee is
entitled only to a summary of what the file contains, and complains that "[t]he act
fails to specify who will make such a summary, who will determine what is to be
included in that summary, and how that summary is to be presented. CWLA, supra
note 58, at 8.
129. See U.A.A. § 6-103(b), Appendix B.
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can be served in a less limiting manner. To avoid situations in which
the person who prepares the summary excludes important information,
this section of the UAA should be modified by the states to allow the
disclosure of copies of the original reports, records or information,
and require that any identifying information about birth parents, the
adoptee, or adoptive parents be excised if waivers of confidentiality
have not been filed by those parties whose identity would otherwise
be revealed.
The Act does create in section 6-105 130 the right to petition the court
to obtain information that is not available simply upon request under
section 6-103. Those permitted to petition include an adult adoptee,
an adoptee under the age of eighteen with permission of an adoptive
parent, an adoptive parent of an adoptee under eighteen, an adult direct
descendant of a deceased adoptee, the parent or guardian of a direct
descendant who is not yet eighteen years old, and a birth parent. Essen-
tially this section provides for the good cause hearing that was available
prior to the enactment of modern disclosure statutes. 131 It is still very
useful for those situations that warrant disclosure and are not addressed
by the general disclosure sections. The right to file for a good cause
hearing, however, should at the least be extended to other biological
relatives beyond birth parents. Allowing medical caregivers to directly
petition a court in situations in which the adult adoptee, adoptive parents
or guardian of a minor adoptee, or patient who is directly related to
the adoptee is not capable of requesting the information directly may
be useful in emergencies.1 32 Because section 6-105 requires findings
of a compelling reason for disclosure and that the benefit to petitioner
outweighs the harm of disclosure to anyone else, the right to file a
petition for a hearing could safely be extended to anyone, it would
seem, thereby allowing the court to address any unique circumstances
not anticipated by the drafters of the Act.
An excellent provision in the Act's disclosure sections is the require-
ment that the court make a diligent effort to notify an adult adoptee,
the adoptive parent of a minor adoptee, and the direct descendant of
a deceased adoptee of the availability of information about a health
condition that may seriously affect the health of the adoptee or a direct
descendant, if that risk is explained in detail in a certified statement
from a physician. A similar requirement for a search for a birth parent
or sibling to communicate the availability of information of a serious
condition of the adoptee or direct descendant that would affect reproduc-
130. U.A.A. § 6-105, Action for Disclosure of Information (1994).
131. See Blair, supra note 21, at n.4 and accompanying text.
132. See Blair, supra note 21, at n.261-62 and accompanying text.
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tive decisions of the birth parent or sibling was discussed above.' 33 The
requirement that the court take proactive steps in these circumstances
is essential.
To facilitate these searches, states may wish to consider providing
that adoptive parents, birth parents and siblings, adult adoptees, descen-
dants of adoptees, guardians of adoptees, and parents or guardians of
descendants may all file with the clerk of the court in which the adoption
is granted a notice of the individual's mailing address (specifying that
this provision does not entitle birth relatives a right to knowledge of
the location of the court if the location is not otherwise known to them).
Access to information would be further enhanced if states chose to
expand the notification concept to provide, in addition to the search
provisions, that whenever supplemental health information is filed with
the court, the court clerk shall notify the appropriate person by ordinary
mail if the person's address is on file with the court clerk. Similarly
agencies or intermediaries who receive supplemental information could
be required to furnish copies to adoptive parents, adult adoptees, or
birth parents when the appropriate individual's location is known to
the agency or intermediary.'34
V. Efforts to Enhance Compliance: Immunity,
Confidentiality, Sanctions, and Liability
A. Immunity
Section 2-106(e) of the UAA provides that information furnished
for the preparation of the preplacement and prehearing reports on medi-
cal and social history cannot be used as evidence in any civil or criminal
proceeding against the person who is the subject of the information. 135
This is a use immunity, which precludes only the subsequent use of
the testimony, i.e., the statements given to the agency or other person
preparing the reports, and any evidence obtained by using the immu-
nized statements or records. 136 It is not a transactional immunity, which
protects a witness from prosecution for those transactions about which
the witness testified under the immunity. 137 The purpose is to foster
more accurate responses on such critical issues as drug or alcohol
133. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
134. The Oklahoma legislature recently adopted legislation containing similar provi-
sions. 1996 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 297, § 5 (West), to be codified at OKLA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 60.5C.
135. See U.A.A. § 2-106(e), Appendix B.
136. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 143, at 355 (3rd
ed. 1984).
137. Id.
Health Disclosure Provisions 465
consumption during pregnancy and physical or sexual abuse. The prose-
cution of mothers for substance abuse during pregnancy and the emerg-
ing recognition of civil liability to a child against a biological mother
for prenatal injury due to negligence prompted the creation of this
immunity. 138 Caution must be taken in juvenile proceedings in which
termination of parental rights is a potential outcome to gather medical
and social history after the prosecutor has gathered the evidence of
abuse to be used in the juvenile proceedings, so that the immunity does
not inhibit the termination proceeding in cases in which the child would
otherwise be at risk. 1
39
B. Confidentiality
To facilitate the collection of accurate medical and social history
and to protect the right of privacy of birth relatives and the child whose
intimate medical and psychological problems are often contained in
reports of this history, it is important that disclosure of medical and
social history records and reports be limited to those with a legitimate
interest who are specifically authorized by the statute to receive it. The
UAA provides this protection, in section 6-102(a), which declares that
all records, whether on file with the court, an agency, or a state depart-
ment such as a Registrar of Vital Statistics, are confidential and may
not be inspected except as provided in the Act. 0 This confidentiality
requirement is repeated in several places throughout the Act.14'
138. UNIF. ADoPTION ACT § 2-106, Comment, 9 U.L.A. 18 (West Supp. 1995);
Blair, supra note 21, at 765-68.
139. Blair, supra note 21, at 767-68.
140. See U.A.A. § 6-102.
141. U.A.A. § 6-102(d) requires that all court records be sealed for 99 years after
the date of the adoptee's birth and not open to inspection to anyone except as provided
in the Act. U.A.A. § 6-102(e) requires that additional information that is submitted
to an agency, lawyer, or other professional provider of services be kept confidential.
U.A.A. § 7-106 provides that the agency or other person who prepares and discloses
reports or records regarding an adoption cannot disclose any identifying or nonidenti-
fying information contained in the reports or records except as authorized by the Act
and creates criminal and civil penalties for unauthorized disclosure of identifying and
nonidentifying information made confidential by the Act.
Other provisions of the Act also protect the confidentiality of identifying information,
unless confidentiality has been waived. U.A.A. § 2-106(d) specifically requires that
medical and social history reports be edited to exclude the identity of any individual
who furnished information, or about whom information is reported, unless confidential-
ity has been waived. See Appendix B. U.A.A. § 6-103 requires that other disclosures
of nonidentifying information exclude identifying information concerning anyone who
has not filed a waiver of confidentiality with the court or the agency. See Appendix
B. U.A.A. § 6-104, which permits the disclosure of identifying information, does so
only when the disclosure is authorized by the persons involved.
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These provisions of the Act have been misconstrued by some critics
of the Act, who disagree with the UAA's provisions limiting the release
of identifying information, a topic beyond the scope of this article.
Concerned United Birthparents 42 and the American Adoption Con-
gress 43 have both publicly taken extreme interpretations of the Act,
stating that it would penalize the sharing of information by adoptive
and birth families who have voluntarily agreed to share it. This is simply
not a reasonable construction of the confidentiality provisions of the
Act. Their purpose was not to strangle dialogue among members of
the adoption triad that is consensually open. In fact, both sections that
address disclosure of health-related information, sections 2-106 and
6-103, specifically provide that identifying information must be ex-
cluded from the nonidentifying information disclosed only when it con-
cerns an individual who has not waived confidentiality.'" The confiden-
tiality provisions of the Act require those who prepare and retain the
records, court and agency personnel, and other professional providers
of services, to keep the information in the records and reports confiden-
tial. Their purpose is to prevent such people from sharing with members
of the public personal information about health, psychological prob-
lems, or private information from the social histories concerning mem-
bers of the birth family and the adoptee. A second purpose is to prevent
disclosure of identifying information between members of the adoption
triad when they have not consented to the disclosure. While these critics
142. Concerned United Birthparents gave this interpretation of an earlier draft (Mar.
20, 1994) of the Act:
Anyone who "assists in ... obtaining ... identifying information contained in
a report or records ... is guilty of a misdemeanor for the first violation and of
a felony for each later violation." Note that criminal liability is not limited to
people who get this information from a sealed record. Even if the information
is obtained independently, such as being next door neighbors, the person could
be subject to criminal penalties. A civil penalty would apply to a person who
reveals or obtains nonidentifying information that is contained in a report or record
under this Act even when the information is not obtained from such a report or
record. There is no exception for open adoptions in which the birth and adoptive
parents have met and visit each other. A birthmother who knew the adoptive
parents could not tell her parents, spouse or subsequent children their identity
(or her child's) since such a disclosure is not authorized by the Act. Adoptive
parents could be arrested for telling the child that the woman sitting next to him
at his birthday party is his birthmother. Id. at 2.
Letter from Janet Fenton, President, & Carole Anderson, Vice President, Concerned
United Birthparents, to Commissioners, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (June 7, 1994).
143. The American Adoption Congress, in its Statement in Opposition to the Uniform
Adoption Act of 1994, also interprets the Act to mean that "the sharing of any informa-
tion by any of the participants becomes a criminal offense." Id. at 3.
144. See U.A.A. §§ 2-106A & 6-103, Appendix B.
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may legitimately adhere to the position that all adoptions should be
open and reject the UAA for permitting closed adoption, their interpre-
tation that the confidentiality provisions prohibit the voluntary exchange
of medical or social history in an open adoption is a distortion of the
Acts' provisions.
States may have other confidentiality statutes that need to be exam-
ined to facilitate the goals of the Act. For example, while there seems
to be total agreement that a prospective adoptive family should be
informed if a child is known to have AIDS or HIV infection, or is at
risk of HIV infection, 45 and in fact such disclosure is in all likelihood
occurring, some states may need to revise their HIV confidentiality
protection statutes to specifically permit such disclosure. 146 Similarly,
states may wish to consider whether an exception should be created,
and if so, under what circumstances, to permit disclosure of a birth
mother's HIV infection or AIDS without her consent. "47 Confidentiality
statutes addressing other venereal diseases present similar issues. Ma-
ternal syphilis during pregnancy, for example, can have devastating
health consequences for a child, 48 and the release of information that
signals a risk can prompt treatment by penicillin that would prevent
impairments to the child from occurring. 149
C. Sanctions
Section 7-105(a) 5° authorizes the imposition of civil monetary penalt-
ies against anyone other than a birth parent who has a duty to disclose
nonidentifying medical and social history through initial reports under
section 2-106 or under the subsequent disclosure provisions of the Act
and intentionally refuses to provide the information. Courts are author-
ized to enjoin further violations of the duty to furnish nonidentifying
information. Section 7-105(b) makes it a misdemeanor for an employee
or agent of the court, agency, or state registrar to intentionally destroy
information and reports compiled pursuant to the initial health disclo-
sure statute, section 2-106, or authorized for subsequent disclosure.
Anyone who knowingly tries to buy or sell nonidentifying information
145. See Groze et al., supra note 17, at 411.
146. Charles Chejfec, Disclosure of an Adoptee 's HIV Status: A Return to Orphan-
ages and Leper Colonies? 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 343 (1995).
147. See Blair, supra note 21, at 753-62.
148. Francis Livingston, Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Pregnancy, STD BULL.,
Apr. 1990, at 3, 3-10 (congenital syphilis can cause mental retardation, blindness,
deformities, blood disorders, and death). See Blair, supra note 21, at 757-58.
149. Center for Disease Control, Sexually Transmitted Disease Treatment Guide-
lines, 38 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 10-11 (Supp. 8 1989).
150. U.A.A. § 7-105 (1994).
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that is not authorized for such disclosure under the Act is also subject
to civil monetary penalties, as is a person who makes an intentional
unauthorized disclosure of nonidentifying information. Any agency,
entity, or person who makes or obtains an unauthorized disclosure can
also be enjoined and a court is specifically authorized to refer such
an agency, entity, or person to an appropriate licensing authority for
disciplinary proceedings. 51 The availability of these sanctions should
have a deterrent effect upon individual employees, agencies, and other
intermediaries who are tempted to intentionally withhold information
or breach the confidentiality required by the Act.
D. Liability
1. CREATION OF A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION
Section 7-105(c) creates civil liability for damages or equitable relief
in favor of an adoptive parent, an adoptee, or any person who is the
subject of the information required to be collected in the initial medical
and social history reports or authorized to be submitted and retained
after finalization, for failure to perform any of the duties connected
with the collection, retention, and disclosure of information required
by the Act. 152 The only entities subject to this civil liability under the
present statutory scheme, however, are an agency or a guardian who
places a child for adoption. Because the statute currently does not place
responsibility for collection or disclosure upon attorneys who serve
as intermediaries or counsel for adoptive parents in direct placement
adoptions,153 they unfortunately cannot be held liable under the Act for
failure to disclose information.
Section 7-106(f) permits any individual who is the subject of any infor-
mation or reports made confidential by the Act to bring an action for
damages or equitable relief against anyone who makes or obtains, or is
likely to make or obtain, an unauthorized disclosure of the information.
2. COMPARISON TO LIABILITY CREATED BY
COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION
a. Actionable Conduct
Clearly the greatest source of litigation against adoption agencies,
and occasionally other professional intermediaries, over the last decade
has been suits for failure to disclose health-related information to pro-
spective adoptive parents. Often labeled by both the courts and the media
151. U.A.A. § 7-106(c)(d)(e) (1994).
152. See U.A.A. § 7-105(c).
153. See supra note 141.
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as suits for "wrongful adoption," these actions are in fact brought under
a variety of legal theories and assert liability for many different types
of alleged misconduct related to nondisclosure. 1
54
In 1986, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Burr v. Board of County Commis-
sioners, '55 became the first court in a published decision to impose liabil-
ity upon an adoption intermediary for misconduct related to the disclo-
sure of health information. In the decade since Burr, state courts have
unanimously imposed liability upon adoption agencies for intentional
misrepresentation and nondisclosure regarding health-related mat-
ters. 156 One of the most recent cases to extend common law fraud princi-
ples to recognize a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation was
the decision of a New York appellate court in Juman v. Louise Wise. 15 7
In Juman, the parents alleged that they had been told only that their infant
son's birth mother had some emotional difficulty, when in fact she had
undergone a frontal lobotomy and a long history of mental illness prior
to the child's birth. They further alleged that they would not have adopted
their son if they had known the true facts; that their son had a history
of psychological disorders, including schizophrenia; and that they have
expended very large sums for treatment. The court found these allega-
tions stated a valid claim for fraud, a claim that the court held should be
recognized in the adoption setting to advance the state's vital interest in
154. See, e.g., D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing
But the Truth: The Limits of Liability for Wrongful Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
Rv. 851 (1992) (comprehensive examination of the conduct held actionable and the
legal theories courts have recognized); ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4,
ch. 16.
155. 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986) (Jury awarded $125,000 in damages to adoptive
parents, finding public agency had intentionally misrepresented the mental health his-
tory and institutionalization of the birth mother and the medical history of the toddler
who was developmentally delayed. The child was ultimately diagnosed with Hunting-
ton's Disease).
156. See Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), app. den.
602 N.E.2d 475 (1992) (allegations that agency advised three adoptive families that chil-
dren were normal in physical and mental condition and development, would require no
extraordinary medical care, and that agency had no further background information when
in fact agency knew two children had history of psychiatric treatment and all three had
exhibited severely abnormal behavior stated a valid cause of action for fraud); Reidy v.
Albany County Dep't of Social Services, 598 N.Y.S.2d 115 (App. Div. 1993) (failure
of agency to reveal history of prior sexual abuse of and by child, despite specific inquiries
by prospective adoptive parents prior to placement, coupled with subsequent sexual prob-
lems of child following placement that caused psychological harm to child and sibling
stated a valid cause of action for fraud); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994) (agencies
should be held liable for intentional misrepresentation made to prospective adoptive par-
ents regarding history of physical and sexual abuse).
157. 608 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), aff'd, 620 N.Y.S.2d 371 (App.
Div. 1995).
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adoption and the welfare of its children. '58 During the past decade, state
courts have been similarly resolute in recognizing liability when the alle-
gations showed intentional nondisclosure of medical history, even if no
affirmative misrepresentation was made. 159 It would appear a similar re-
sult would be reached under section 7-105(c), as intentional misrepresen-
tation must clearly be viewed as a violation of the implicit duties required
by section 2-106, and intentional nondisclosure is a direct violation of
that section, which mandates that all reasonably available medical and
social history be provided to the prospective adoptive parents.
Although earlier decisions were split regarding the viability of a
claim for negligent misrepresentation of health-related information,
recent courts to address this issue have all recognized liability in this
context. 160 In 1995, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Mohr
158. 608 N.Y.S.2d at 613-17.
159. Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr.
504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (liability may be imposed upon agency if evidence at trial
establishes agency intentionally failed to disclose doctor's refusal to render a prognosis
for this infant); Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (not only
affirmative misrepresentations, but intentional failure to disclose necessary medical and
psychological information to prospective adoptive parents could subject an agency to
liability). Cf M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d at 282 (Minn. 1992)
(Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to show intentional nondisclosure, when none
of evidence showed agency intended to mislead plaintiff by failure to disclose full
facts. Agency advised prospective adoptive parents that there was incest in the family,
but failed to disclose birth parents were siblings and that father had undergone psychiat-
ric treatment. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, did not reverse the lower
appellate court's finding that intentional nondisclosure could be actionable in the adop-
tion context, as long as there is proof of intent to mislead adoptive parents.); Allen
v. Allen, 330 P.2d 151 (Or. 1958) (In a decision that predated Burr, the court denied
damages for failure to disclose information regarding the child's mental condition,
finding evidence failed to support fraud and defendant's conduct was at most careless.).
160. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d at 890-92 (recognizing a claim for negligent mis-
representation if an adoption agency volunteers information to prospective parents, fails
to make reasonable efforts to determine whether its representations are true, and misrep-
resents a material fact about the condition of a child that was foreseeable at the time of
placement); Meracle v. Children's Services Society, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989)
(Agency could be held liable for negligent affirmative misrepresentation about child's
risk of contracting Huntington's disease, if agency voluntarily assumes the duty to inform
the parents about the child's risk.); M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d at
288 ("Public policy does not preclude a negligent misrepresentation action against an
adoption agency where the agency, having undertaken to disclose information about the
child's genetic parents and medical background, negligently withholds information in
such a way that the adoptive parents were misled as to the truth. "). Cf Wallerstein v.
Hosp. Corp. of America, 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (Parents stated valid claim
for negligent misrepresentation against physician who assured them infant was healthy
when in fact he suffered chronic, fixed nonprogressive encephalopathy and cerebral
palsy).
But see Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Service, 165 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980) (When adoption agency made full disclosure of medical history, claim
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v. Commonwealth, 161 upheld a jury verdict against an adoption agency
that told adoptive parents that it had no medical history other than the
child's small size and suspected malnutrition, when in fact the agency
knew the birth mother was schizophrenic and that the child had been
diagnosed as mentally retarded with moderate cerebral atrophy. The
court declared that claims based upon both negligent and intentional
misrepresentation must be recognized, holding that the "compelling
need of adoptive parents for full disclosure of medical background
information that may be known to the agency ...to secure timely
and appropriate medical care for the child, but also to make vital per-
sonal, health and family decisions. . . outweighs any increased burden
that is placed on adoption agencies when liability is imposed for negli-
gent as well as intentional misrepresentation." 62 That same summer,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Mallette v. Children's Friend
and Service, 163 upheld the validity of a claim for negligent misrepresen-
tation against an agency that was alleged to have revealed only that
the birth mother suffered learning disabilities caused solely from head
trauma. In fact, she had been diagnosed as mild to moderately retarded
with only an undocumented possibility that her condition was caused
by trauma; she had been diagnosed as possessing macrocephaly,
pseudoepicanthal folds, a high-arched palate, tachycardia, and other
symptoms; and the biological grandmother was intellectually limited.
At age thirteen the plaintiffs' son was mentally retarded and severely
disturbed.'64 The court recognized a claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion despite the fact that Rhode Island had no statutory duty to disclose,
declaring that "an adoption system based upon fairness and fuller dis-
closure of nonidentifying information concerning the child remains the
ideal.' 65 The court went on to state:
[T]he need for accurate disclosure becomes more acute when special needs
children are involved. Parents need to be financially and emotionally
equipped to provide an atmosphere that is optimally conducive to that special
child's growth and development. Although biological parents can assess
the risks of having a child by investigating their own genetic backgrounds,
adopting parents remain at the mercy of adoption agencies for information,
particularly in this state. We believe extending the tort of negligent represen-
for negligent misrepresentation was rejected in adoption context. Agency reported
child was in good health and three years later he was diagnosed with severe neurological
damage.).
161. 653 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1995).
162. 653 N.E.2d at 1111.
163. 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995).
164. 661 A.2d. at 68.
165. 661 A.2d at 73.
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tation to the adoption context will help alleviate some of the artificial uncer-
tainty imposed on a situation inherent with uncertainty."6
Until recently few courts had addressed liability for negligent failure
to disclose health-related information apart from liability for negligent
affirmative representations. Recently, however, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in Gibbs v. Ernst,167 held that "an adoption agency has
a duty to disclose fully and accurately to the adoptive parents all relevant
non-identifying information in its possession concerning the
adoptee," 1 68 and recognized a cause of action for negligent failure to
disclose health information separate from liability for negligent misrep-
resentation. The court found Pennsylvania's disclosure statute created
a duty to reveal fully and accurately all available nonidentifying infor-
mation about a child. Apart from the statute, however, the court found
that the unique relationship of trust and confidence between the agency
and the prospective parents creates a duty to disclose fully and accu-
rately the history the agency has obtained.
69
The plaintiffs in Gibbs adopted a child through a private agency that
was working in conjunction with a public agency to place a child who
was a ward of the state. They were told the child was five (he was
actually seven), that he had only been in foster care for two years with
only one family, that he had been verbally abused by his mother but
not physically or sexually abused, and that he was hyperactive and
behind in his school work. Four years after the adoption, the parents
learned their son had been severely abused, both physically and sexu-
ally, that he had been in ten different foster placements, that his birth
mother at one time attempted to cut off his penis, and that he had an
extensive history prior to placement of aggressiveness and hostility
toward children. By the time they learned this, their son had been
permanently institutionalized, after having attempted to amputate the
arm of a five year old, attempting to suffocate one cousin, attempting
to kill another cousin with a lead pipe, starting a fire which seriously
injured another cousin, and deliberately placing Clorox in a cleaning
solution, causing his mother severe burns to her hands. 70 The court
found the complaint stated separate valid causes of action for intentional
misrepresentation or fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent
166. 661 A.2d at 73.
167. 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994).
168. 647 A.2d at 892.
169. 647 A.2d at 892-93.
170. 647 A.2d at 885-86.
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failure to disclose information that the agencies had in their possession
about Michael at the time of the adoption. 
7
'
Other courts have also determined that the conduct of negligent fail-
ure to disclose could create liability under the legal theories of negligent
misrepresentation or negligence. 172 Several courts, however, often in
dicta, have rejected the idea that negligent failure to disclose informa-
tion, without an affirmative misrepresentation, would create liability. 173
The cause of action created by section 7-105(c) would clearly encom-
pass a claim for negligent failure to disclose, since section 2-106 specifi-
cally imposes a duty to disclose to prospective adoptive parents all
reasonably available information concerning medical and social history.
Although the statute does not specifically state that the reports must
be accurate, it is quite possible that courts would interpret section 2-106
to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid misrepresentation.
Thus, the liability created by section 7-105(c) is clearly consistent with
the recent trend of the courts to find liability based on common law
negligence theories for negligent failure to disclose and negligent affir-
mative misrepresentations, but would extend liability if adopted in those
171. 647 A.2d at 889-94.
172. Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (recognizing
nondisclosure alone, without affirmative misrepresentation, could create liability under
a negligent misrepresentation theory. The court held an adoption agency owes a duty
to adoptive parents to give honest and complete responses to adoptive parents' specific
requests about the characteristics of a specific child for adoption.); M.H. v. Caritas
Family Services, 488 N.W.2d at 288 (negligent withholding of information in a way
that misleads adoptive parents can create liability for negligent misrepresentations).
See Mohr v. Commonwealth, 653 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (Mass. 1995) (recognizing
liability for negligent misrepresentation, the court went on to state, "We add that an
adoption agency does have an affirmative duty to disclose to adoptive parents informa-
tion about a child that will enable them to make a knowledgeable decision about whether
to accept the child for adoption.").
173. Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr.
at 513; Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990) (The agency failed to fill in
a blank on their form next to PKU, causing the pediatrician to erroneously believe
the test had been done. The child developed severe and irreversible brain damage
which could have been prevented. The court denied liability, holding the agency's
actions were not the proximate cause of the child's injuries. The court did not
separately analyze duty to transmit information with reasonable care. The opinion
could be interpreted as a holding that no such duty existed, or as a determination
that the duty was not breached in this case.). See Mallette v. Children's Friend
and Service, 661 A.2d 67, 73 (R.I. 1995) ("[T]here is no legislative duty to disclose
any information concerning a child's background to potential adopting parents.
Although the wisdom of such legislative inaction is certainly open to question, we
believe that given the competing policy concerns involved, these issues remain
squarely within the Legislature's prerogative). See also Meracle v. Children's Serv.
Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989).
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states whose courts have addressed the issue, albeit often in dicta, and
refused recognition of such liability to date.
All courts that have addressed the issue have explicitly rejected the
imposition of liability under the common law for failure to investigate.
In Gibbs, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to allow plaintiffs
to proceed to trial on the cause of action for failure to investigate
Michael's mental and physical health. The court found that neither
common law nor Pennsylvania's adoption statute created a duty of
reasonable investigation. Paradoxically, the court found that Pennsylva-
nia's Adoption Act required "a good faith effort to obtain medical
history information on the part of adoption intermediaries," but not a
"requirement of a comprehensive investigation into the background
of a child in order to avoid liability." 17 4 The court concluded that
creation of a duty to investigate would be too burdensome for adoption
intermediaries, and that the good faith requirement implicit in the Adop-
tion Act prevents an intermediary from operating on a "less informa-
tion, less liability" basis.175 The court did not explain how the Act's
requirement of a good faith effort to obtain medical information would
be enforced if there is no liability for failure to make reasonable efforts
to investigate. It is possible that under the facts as alleged in Gibbs, the
court may not have felt constrained to recognize the duty to investigate
because there were other theories under which plaintiffs could be com-
pensated.
In Foster v. Bass, 176 the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to im-
pose liability on an agency that placed a newborn who had not been
tested for phenylketonunia. The agency left the space next to PKU
blank on the medical history, which the doctor interpreted to mean that
the results were not back yet. No test was done and the child suffered
severe, irreversible brain damage, which could have been prevented
with proper treatment had the test been performed. The parents brought
an action on behalf of the child, alleging, among other things, that the
agency was negligent for failing to have the infant tested for PKU while
he was in their care, and for failing to order the PKU test prior to
adoption when their own records failed to record the test results. The
majority, however, held that the duty to determine if the child had
PKU rested solely with the doctors, and that the agency, which had
no physicians on staff, should not be saddled with the same kind of
duty to investigate the blank beside PKU on their own form. 177 The
174. 647 A.2d at 893-94.
175. 647 A.2d at 894.
176. 575 So. 2d 967.
177. 575 So. 2d at 977.
Health Disclosure Provisions 475
opinion contained a strong dissent arguing that liability could potentially
be premised upon representations made in the agency's brochure that the
agency would "conduct a painstakingly thorough and time consuming
investigative procedure" into, inter alia, "the child's physical and
mental health potential.' ' 78 Several other courts in dicta have
disclaimed a duty to discover health information. 179
Thus, the imposition of liability for negligent failure to investigate
may be the one issue on which section 7-105(c) makes a significant
leap ahead of the common law liability that has been recognized to
date. In the Comment to section 7-105(c), the drafters note that
[t]he Act's requirement that agencies, parents, lawyers and others involved
in an adoption must provide background information that is 'reasonably
available' is intended to create a statutory duty to use reasonable efforts to
obtain the information and to disclose the information that is collected to
prospective adoptive parents . . .[S]ubsection (c) allows adoptive parents
and adoptees to maintain an action for damages or equitable relief for failures
to provide reasonably available background information.' 80
Creation of liability for negligent failure to investigate makes eminent
good sense. Absent recognition of a duty to investigate, some intermedi-
aries might choose to put little effort into the collection process on the
supposition that the less information they possess, the less they are
obligated to disclose, and the less their potential liability will be. More
commonly, agencies short on staff or time may be tempted to shortcut
the process absent liability for such conduct. The concern of the courts
that creation of liability for negligent investigation will be unduly bur-
densome, although well-intentioned, appears to be misplaced. Section
2-106 creates the duty to furnish reasonably available information,
which assumes the duty to obtain it. Imposing liability for failure to
investigate simply creates incentive to do what the statute already re-
quires. Moreover, the statute provides guidance about the effort ex-
pected. The kind of information to be obtained is set out in some detail,'8 '
and sections 2-106 and 3-404(e) instruct that all of the reasonably avail-
able information described is to be obtained from any person who has
had legal or physical custody of the child, which would always include
the birth mother; anyone who has provided medical, psychological,
educational, or similar services to the child; and the birth father. 82
The law of negligence has long employed a reasonableness standard
178. 575 So. 2d at 987-92.
179. Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d at 537; M.H. v. Caritas
Family Services, 475 N.W.2d at 98.
180. 9 U.L.A. 89 (West Supp. 1995).
181. See supra notes 25-49 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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to determine when conduct is actionable.'83 While it is true that what
is reasonable under the circumstances cannot be measured, predicted,
and defined with precision in the statute for every circumstance that
might arise, imposing a duty of reasonable conduct in the collection
of health information is no less onerous than applying the law of negli-
gence to the many other contexts in which it has been employed. If
the goals of the UAA regarding the provision of health information
are to be realized, adoption intermediaries must make a reasonable
effort to collect accurate and complete information. The imposition of
liability for failure to fulfill this duty helps ensure that this will occur.
Finally, sections 7-105(c) and 7-106(d) impose liability for making or
obtaining an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Al-
though suits of this nature have been far less frequent than suits for failure
to disclose, it does not appear that establishing a statutory basis for liabil-
ity against one who made an unauthorized disclosure of confidential
adoption information would be a marked expansion of liability under the
common law. In 1985, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Humphers v. First
Interstate Bank of Oregon,'84 upheld the validity of a claim by a birth
mother against the doctor who delivered her child and later assisted the
twenty-one year old adoptee in locating her mother by revealing the birth
mother's identity to the daughter. Although the court rejected liability
under the theory of invasion of privacy, the court upheld the birth moth-
er's claim for breach of confidentiality, noting that a number of decisions
in other contexts have found that the unauthorized and unprivileged dis-
closure of confidential information obtained in a confidential relation-
ship can give rise to tort damages. 185 Recently, a federal district court in
Pennsylvania upheld an adult adoptee's claims for invasion of privacy,
negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against a case-
worker who, without the adoptee's permission and in violation of state
law, released the adoptee's address to her older biological sister.'86
The liability under tort law of a person who obtains confidential
adoption information does not appear to have been litigated in a pub-
183. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
132 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281-282 (1965).
184. 696 P.2d 527, 536 (Ore. 1985).
185. See Blair, supra note 21, at 687-95 (discussion of constitutional and tort theories
underlying liability for invasion of privacy).
186. John Beauge, Adoptee 's Suit is Permitted to Proceed; Claims Address Illegally
Given to Sister, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, May 2, 1996 (suit filed by Carol Sandusky,
her spouse and her adoptive parents against Cumberland County Children and Youth
Services, its administrator Gary I. Shuey, and caseworker Marlene Bohr in U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging disclosure violated Pennsylvania
law). See also Dinah Wisenberg Brin, Adoptee Battles to Keep Knowledge About Birth
Parents, Families Private; She Files Suit After Sister, Caseworker Seeks Her Out,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 14, 1996.
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lished decision, and the imposition of statutory liability upon this group
may well forge new ground.
b. Potential Defendants
Liability for failure to collect or disclose information under the cur-
rent UAA can only be established against adoption agencies, who have
traditionally been the targets of such suits under the common law, and
against guardians placing children for adoption. Attorneys who serve
as counsel for adoptive parents or adoption intermediaries in direct
placement adoption are not currently liable under the Act for failure
to investigate or disclose information.
Attorneys representing adoptive parents may well be held liable
to the adoptive parents for failure to disclose information under ex-
isting tort law, however, under the legal theory of malpractice. 187
Experienced adoption lawyers caution that in a direct placement
adoption, failure to obtain a complete health history from both birth
parents and provide it to the adoptive parents might be a breach of
the attorney's duty to his clients.188 Attorneys representing parents
who adopt through an agency may have a duty to make reasonable
efforts to ascertain whether the health history was investigated and
fully conveyed to the clients, to the extent this can be verified by
the attorney. One attorney specializing in adoption practice cautions
that failure to scrutinize the agency's written medical report could
lead to a malpractice claim. 189 Suits of this nature have already been
filed in Texas.' 90
187. See ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at § 16.03[8] (discussion
of this theory in the context of wrongful adoption litigation).
188. DAVID LEAVITT, COUNSELING CLIENTS IN INDEPENDENT ADOPTION 25-26
(California Continuing Education of the Bar 1980); McLeod, supra note 69, at 50
("A growing trend in recent litigation premised on wrongful adoption... suggests that
a careful lawyer should thoroughly disclose the biological parents' available medical
background. Lawyers, doctors, and agencies who have failed to disclose or negligently
concealed permanent medical history have been held liable. I seek permission from
the biological parent to request specific testing during her pregnancy for sexually
transmitted diseases (STPs) and AIDS.").
189. R. Godwin & K. Biedzynski, Liability for Wrongful Adoption Looms Large,
N.J. L.J., September 12, 1991, at 7.
190. In Martin v. Methodist Home, Case No. 90-07815, Complaint at 9 (14th
Judicial District, Dist. Ct. of Dallas Cty. Texas), plaintiffs sued the attorney who
represented them and the attorney's firm for malpractice, alleging the attorney failed
to insist that the agency fulfill its duty to disclose medical and social history and failed
on her own to disclose to the adoptive parents information the attorney allegedly
had in her possession. Telephone Interview with Professor Neil Cogan, Counsel for
plaintiffs (Apr. 9, 1993). A published opinion resolving a discovery dispute in this
case is found in Methodist Home v. Marshall, 830 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
In Burgess v. Smithlawn Maternity Center, a similar claim was made by adoptive
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Attorneys may also be potentially liable to adoptees who are harmed
by the nondisclosure. Although liability for malpractice in favor of
third parties has been recognized only in very limited circumstances,
a Florida appellate court recently held that a cause of action for profes-
sional negligence on behalf of a child against an attorney who initiates
a private adoption proceeding does not require privity between the child
and the attorney."'9 Although the negligence in this case did not involve
the disclosure of health-related information, it opens the door for adopt-
ees who were denied proper treatment due to improper disclosure to
bring a malpractice action against the attorney who served as intermedi-
ary or represented the adoptive parents.
The Act specifically excludes an action for nondisclosure against a
birth parent who places a minor for adoption. Comments to section
7-105 note that the exception of birth parents from liability was moti-
vated by a concern that they would otherwise be deterred from con-
senting or relinquishing. "The Act's goal is to facilitate adoptions,
not to impede them by punishing parents."'92 Compelled cooperation
through a threat of liability would be ineffective and create some risk
that parents who were forced to participate would offer inaccurate
information. The drafters made a wise decision in this regard.
VI. Conclusion
The UAA treats the subject of disclosure of nonidentifying health
information in a comprehensive manner. With a few minor modifica-
tions and implementing regulations as suggested herein, states should
consider adopting these sections, or modifying their existing statutes
to include the provisions not currently in their own legislation. The
drafters of the UAA created a model that will promote the complete
and accurate disclosure of medical and social history to prospective
adoptive parents and others with a legitimate interest in the information,
thus, facilitating medical care for adoptees and their descendants, the
transmission of critical genetic information back to birth families, an
opportunity for informed choice by adoptive parents, and an appropriate
placement of a child in a home prepared emotionally and financially
to meet the child's needs.
parents against their attorney for failure to require the agency to disclose to the adoptive
parents the information required by law. Case no. 92594 (U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Tex.
Dallas Div.) (filed Mar. 27, 1992).
191. Rushing v. Bosse, 652 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
192. 9 U.L.A. 89 (West Supp. 1995).
Appendix A
State Health Disclosure Statutes
Alabama ALA. CODE §§ 26-10A-19, -31 (1992)
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §
25.23.185 (1995)
Arizona ARiz. REV. STAT. § 8-129 (1956); AIRz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8-120, -121, -134 (Supp. 1995)
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie Supp. 1987); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-506 (Michie 1987)
California CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8207, 8608, 8706, 8801.3, 8801.5,
8817, 8818, 8909, 9202 (West 1994); CAL. CIv. CODE §
1798.24 (West 1994)
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-5-207, 19-5-401 to 403 (Supp.
1995)
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-746 (Supp. 1995); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-749, -750, -754 (1958)
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924, 1112 (1995)
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-307, -308, -311 (1981)
Florida FLA. STAT. ch. 63.022, 63.082, 63.162 (Supp. 1996)
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-8-23, -18 (1991)
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993)
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1995)
Illinois ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, para. 505/22.3; ch. 750, para.
50/18.1, 50/18.3, 50/18.4, 50/18.4a (Smith-Hurd 1992)
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-1-2, 31-3-4-.5-3, 32-3-4-7, 31-
3-4-8, 31-3-4-14, 31-3-4-21 (West Supp. 1995)
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 600.8, 600.16 (West 1996)
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2128, 2130, 2135, 2122 (1994)
Kentucky Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.520, .570, .572 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1995)
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1124, 1125, 1127 (1995); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1126 (Supp. 1995)
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8205; tit. 19, §§ 1125,
1131, 1132 (West Supp. 1995)
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 5-328, 5-329, 5-329.1, 19-
534 (1991)
Massachusetts MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, §§ 5A, 5D; ch. 28A,
§ 9 (West 1991)
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.27,.68 (West Supp.
1996)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.27, .23, .43 (West Supp.
1996)
Mississippi Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-17-205, -209, -215 (1972)
Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.653 (Vernon Supp. 1996); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 451-073,-120, -121 (Vernon 1991); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (Vernon Supp. 1996)
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State Health Disclosure Statutes
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-8-103, -126, -109, 48-8-109
(1995)
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-107, -128, -146.02, - 146.04
(1993)
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 127.140, 440.310 (1991); 1993
NEV. STAT. 2682 (Amended version of NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 127.130)
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-b: 19 (1994)
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:341.1 (West Supp. 1995)
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3, -12, -14, -31, -40, -41
(1995)
New York N.Y. Soc. SER. LAW § 373-a (McKinney 1993); N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1993); N.Y. PUB-
Lic HEALTH LAW § 4138-c, 4138-d (McKinney 1993 &
Supp. 1996); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112 (McKinney
1993 & Supp. 1996)
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-9-103, -105 (1995)
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (Supp. 1995)
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.12, .17, .39, .121 (Bal-
dwin 1995)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 57, 60.5A, 60.17 (Supp. 1996)
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.342, .500 (1993)
Pennsylvania 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2905, 2909 (Supp 1995)
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6-13, 23-6-14, 23-3-23 (1956)
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1740, 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1995)
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-6-15.1, -15.2, -15.3
(1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-6-22,-23
(Supp. 1995)
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-11, -102, -141, -133, -135,
-138 (Supp. 1995)
Texas TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.032, 162.005, .006, .007,
.008, .018 (West Supp. 1996)
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-16, -17 (1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-30-18 (Supp. 1995)
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 436, 461 (1989), VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 462, 463 (Supp. 1995)
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-233, -236, -236.01 (Michie
1995)
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.33.020, .330, .340,
.350, .380 (Supp. 1996)
West Virginia W. VA. CODE §§ 48-4A-1, -2, -6, -10 (1995)
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.93, .425, .432, .433 (West
1995)
Wyoming WYO. STAT. § 1-22-116 (Supp. 1995)
Appendix B
Selected UAA Health Disclosure Provisions
SECTION 2-106. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON BACKGROUND.
(a) As early as practicable before a prospective adoptive parent accepts physical
custody of a minor, a person placing the minor for adoption shall furnish to
the prospective adoptive parent a written report containing all of the following
information reasonably available from any person who has had legal or physical
custody of the minor or who has provided medical, psychological, educational,
or similar services to the minor:
(1) a current medical and psychological history of the minor, including an
account of the minor's prenatal care, medical condition at birth, any drug or
medication taken by the minor's mother during pregnancy, any subsequent
medical, psychological, or psychiatric examination and diagnosis, any physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse suffered by the minor, and a record of any immuniza-
tions and health care received while in foster or other care;
(2) relevant information concerning the medical and psychological history
of the minor's genetic parents and relatives, including any known disease or
hereditary predisposition to disease, any addiction to drugs or alcohol, the health
of the minor's mother during her pregnancy, the health of each parent at the
minor's birth; and
(3) relevant information concerning the social history of the minor and the
minor's parents and relatives, including:
(i) the minor's enrollment and performance in school, results of educa-
tional testing, and any special educational needs;
(ii) the minor's racial, ethnic, and religious background, tribal affiliation,
and a general description of the minor's parents;
(iii) an account of the minor's past and existing relationship with any
individual with whom the minor has regularly lived or visited;
(iv) the level of educational and vocational achievement of the minor's
parents and relatives and any noteworthy accomplishments;
(4) information concerning a criminal conviction of a parent for a felony,
a judicial order terminating the parental rights of a parent, and a proceeding in
which the parent was alleged to have abused, neglected, abandoned, or otherwise
mistreated the minor, a sibling of the minor, or the other parent;
(5) information concerning a criminal conviction or delinquency adjudication
of the minor; and
(6) information necessary to determine the minor's eligibility for state or
federal benefits, including subsidies for adoption and other financial, medical,
or similar assistance.
(b) Before a hearing on a petition for adoption, the person who placed a minor
for adoption shall furnish to the prospective adoptive parent a supplemental written
report containing information required by subsection (a) which was unavailable
before the minor was placed for adoption, but becomes reasonably available to
the person after the placement.
(c) The court may request that a respondent in a proceeding under Article 3,
Part 5, supply the information required by this section.
(d) A report furnished under this section must indicate who prepared the
report and, unless confidentiality has been waived, be edited to exclude the
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identity of any individual who furnished information or about whom information
is reported.
(e) Information furnished under this section may not be used as evidence in
any civil or criminal proceeding against an individual who is the subject of the
information.
(f) The Department shall prescribe forms designed to obtain the specific infor-
mation sought under this section and shall furnish the forms to a person who is
authorized to place a minor for adoption or who provides services with respect
to placements for adoption.
SECTION 6-103. RELEASE OF NONIDENTIFYING INFORMATION.
(a) An adoptive parent or guardian of an adoptee, an adoptee who has attained
18 years of age, an emancipated adoptee, a deceased adoptee's direct descendant
who has attained 18 years of age, or the parent or guardian of a direct descendant
who has attained 18 years of age may request the court that granted the adoption
or the agency that placed the adoptee for adoption, to furnish the nonidentifying
information about the adoptee, the adoptee's former parents, and the adoptee's
genetic history that has been retained by the court or agency, including the informa-
tion required by Section 2-106.
(b) The court or agency shall furnish the individual who makes the request
with a detailed summary of any relevant report or information that is included in
the sealed records of the court or the confidential records of the agency. The
summary must exclude identifying information concerning an individual who has
not filed a waiver of confidentiality with the court or agency. The Department
or the court shall prescribe forms and a procedure for summarizing any report
or information released under this section.
(c) An individual who is denied access to nonidentifying information to which
the individual is entitled under this Article or Section 2-106 may petition the court
for relief.
(d) If a court receives a certified statement from a physician explaining in detail
how a health condition may seriously affect the health of the adoptee or a direct
descendant of the adoptee, the court shall make a diligent effort to notify an adoptee
who has attained 18 years of age, an adoptive parent of any adoptee who has not
attained 18 years of age, or a direct descendant of a deceased adoptee that the
nonidentifying information is available and may be requested from the court.
(e) If a court receives a certified statement from a physician explaining in detail
why a serious health condition of the adoptee or a direct descendant of the adoptee
should be communicated to the adoptee's genetic parent or sibling to enable them
to make an informed reproductive decision, the court shall make a diligent effort
to notify those individuals that the nonidentifying information is available and
may be requested from the court.
(f) If the [Registrar] receives a request or any additional information from an
individual pursuant to this section, the [Registrar] shall give the individual the
name and address of the court or agency having the records, and if the court or
agency is in another State, shall assist the individual in locating the court or agency.
The [Registrar] shall prescribe a reasonable procedure for verifying the identity,
age, or other relevant characteristics of an individual who request or furnishes
information under this section.
